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Translational Ecology and Environmental Law 
 
Robert W. Adler  
 




 Translational ecology is a comparatively new approach to the pursuit of ecology and other 
environmental sciences, the implications of which for environmental law have not previously been 
explored significantly. Emulating the concepts of translational medicine, proponents of 
transactional ecology seek to increase the relevance of their research to important environmental 
problems by improving how effectively they communicate research results to end users of that 
science, collaborating with those end users to identify research that is “actionable” rather than 
purely “curiosity-driven” or theoretical, recognizing that values as well as science have a 
legitimate role in environmental decisions, and engaging in ongoing dialogues about the 
relationship between science and other issues and values to build trust across disciplines. Several 
major federal environmental statutes provide examples of ways in which the practice of 
translational ecology could contribute to better implementation of environmental laws. More 
broadly, translational ecology has the potential to transform the relationship between science and 
law in setting and implementing environmental policy.   
 




In 2010, Dr. William H. Schlesinger published an editorial in Science advocating for a new 
approach to the science of applied ecology.1 Borrowing from the concept of translational medicine2 
and other efforts to promote “usable science,”3 Schlesinger argued that ecologists need to 
transcend pure science and to become more actively involved in communicating the implications 
and application of their research for environmental policy. That effort, he argued, required a 
“constant, two-way communication between stakeholders and scientists,” and efforts to synthesize 
 
 Distinguished Professor, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. This article is based on a plenary 
presentation to the annual meeting of the Society of Freshwater Science (SFS) in Salt Lake City, Utah, May 22, 2019. 
The presentation was called “Dormant Opportunities: Translational Ecology and the Clean Water Act.” This article 
expands on the themes presented in that talk. The author appreciates the invitation from Dr. Jennifer Tank of the 
University of Notre Dame, then President of SFS.  
1 W.H. Schlesinger, Translational Ecology, 329 SCIENCE 609 (2010).  
2 See Francesco M. Marincola, Translational Medicine: A two-way road, 1 J. TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE (2003), 
available at https://doi.org/10.1186/1479-5876-1-1.  
3 See, generally, University of Colorado and Arizona State University, Science Policy Assessment and Research on 
Climate Change Program, Usable Science: A Handbook for Science Policy Decision Makers, available at 
https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/research_areas/sparc/outreach/sparc_handbook/refs.html.] 
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existing scientific knowledge to articulate its relevance to policy.4 Schlesinger’s seminal plea led 
to additional work by interdisciplinary teams of scientists to explicate, develop, and promote the 
concept of translational ecology.5 
 Schlesinger’s core idea is that ecologists should not remain aloof from the public policy 
implications of their work, and should conduct policy-relevant research rather than work that is 
interesting or important solely from a scientific perspective.6 This assertion parallels a broader 
discussion about the responsibility of scientists to engage in important public policy 
conversations,7 if not to play an active advocacy role where they believe that existing law and 
policy run afoul of important scientific information.8 Some scientists, however, believe that 
advocacy can compromise the appropriate role of scientists and the objectivity that is fundamental 
to scientific inquiry.9   
 Translational ecologists seek to increase the relevance of their research to environmental 
policy, and environmental policy is necessarily guided or directed by environmental law. Much of 
 
4 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.  
5 See infra Part II. 
6 Others describe the traditional approach to science as “curiosity-driven” or a “theory-driven” inquiry. See Mark W. 
Schwartz, et al., Developing a Translational Ecology Workforce, 15 FRONT. IN ECOL. AND THE ENV’T. 587, 587 
(2017).  
7 See, e.g., Brendan E. Mackey, Comment: Environmental Scientists, Advocacy, and the Future of the Earth, 26 
ENVT’L CONSERVATION 245, 249 (1999) (arguing that “scientists have a responsibility to engage in public debate 
about the state of the environment, so that people can make informed decisions about the kind of world they are 
creating”). 
8 For an example of scientists taking a more active advocacy role directly relevant to the conference presentation that 
inspires this article, see Letter dated April 12, 2019 from Dr. Jennifer Tank, President, Society for Freshwater Science 
to Mr. Andrew Wheeler, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Mr. R.D. James, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (transmitting comments of the Society for Freshwater Science on  proposed 
amendments to definition of “waters of the United States, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149) (on file with 
author).  The comment letter begins by noting that the Society for Freshwater Science, on behalf of its more than 1,000 
member scientists “strongly opposes the proposed rule.” Id. at 1. 
9 See Robert T. Lackey, Science, Scientists, and Policy Advocacy, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 12, 16 (2007) 
(encouraging scientists to contribute to contribute to public discourse but only within the scope of their scientific 
expertise, while cautioning against advocacy based on individual opinions and values); J. Scott Armstrong, Advocacy 
and Objectivity in Science, 5 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 423, 427 (1979) (concluding based on a comparison of 
alternative methods in management science that scientists who advocate for particular hypotheses showed less 
objectivity than those who tested competing hypotheses). Armstrong was using the term “advocacy” in a slightly 
different way than suggested by Schlesinger, but Armstrong’s point would be even more relevant to policy advocacy. 
But see, John E. Kotcher, et al., Does Engagement in Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results from a 
Randomized National Survey Experiment, 11 ENVT’L COMMUNICATION 415, 423-26 (2017) (suggesting that 
participation in advocacy by climate scientists and other scientists does not necessarily harm their credibility); Michael 
P. Nelson & John A. Vucetich, On Advocacy by Environmental Scientists: What, Whether, Why and How, 23 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1090, 1099 (2009) (concluding, based on a comprehensive review of literature arguing for 
and against advocacy by environmental scientists, that “scientists, by virtue of being citizens first and scientists second, 
have a responsibility to advocate to the best of their abilities and in a justified and transparent manner”).  
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the literature regarding translational ecology addresses its relationship to environmental law, 
however, only through this inference.10 Environmental lawyers have not yet become a significant 
part of the translational ecology discussion, and they have not yet participated in the 
interdisciplinary teams exploring this new approach. This article begins the process of bridging 
that gap.  
 Part II describes the evolving practice of translational ecology in more detail. In addition 
to ensuring that readers understand the goals and methods of translational ecology, it identifies key 
principles of that process that may be relevant to the implementation of environmental law. It also 
distinguishes translational ecology from other concepts of applied ecology that have been 
identified in the past as relevant to environmental and natural resources law.11 What new ideas are 
added by translational ecology, the legal implications of which have not been explored through 
the lenses of these other practices? 
 Part III of the article explores ways in which translational ecology might be helpful in 
improving implementation of some of the major U.S. federal environmental statutes, but it also 
probes its potential limitations in that regard. This analysis begins with the Clean Water Act,12 
both because of the ecological focus of that statute, and because my exploration of those 
possibilities for the annual meeting of the Society for Freshwater Science13 began and inspired the 
rest of this analysis. Other statutes that will be explored in detail for purposes of example include 
the National Environmental Policy Act14 and the Endangered Species Act,15 but translational 
ecology could also be applicable to many other federal environmental and natural resource 
management statutes.16   
 Using these examples as a foundation, Part IV explores the broader implications of 
translational ecology for the relationship between environmental law and environmental science. 
 
10 One analysis cites law as one example of the kinds of cross-disciplinary knowledge ecologists should have to 
practice translational ecology. See Schwartz, et al., supra note 6, at 587, 588 Panel 1.  
11 See infra Part II.B. 
12 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.1. 
13 See supra note *.  
14 42 U.S.C. §4331 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.2. 
15 16 U.S.C. §1651 et seq.; see infra Part II.B.3. 
16 Examples include the natural resource damage assessment process in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§9607(a)(4)(C), 9607(f) (providing for assessment of natural 
resource damages by government trustees of natural resources impaired or destroyed by releases of hazardous 
substances); and the public land and natural resource inventory and planning processes mandated by statutes such as 
the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§1711-1712.  
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As I have suggested elsewhere,17 that relationship is neither static nor unidirectional, but rather 
reflects a far more dynamic relationship rather than one in which science simply serves 
informational needs in the legal process or law effectuates information and knowledge produced 
by science.18 Part IV suggests that the collaboration and trust building advocated by proponents of 
translational ecology could help to shift the focus of environmental law and policymaking to 
consideration and balancing of legitimate competing values rather than adversarial disputes about 
the science needed to inform the policy discourse. 
 Part V concludes that translational ecology shares some of the attributes of earlier efforts 
to apply ecological science to environmental law and policy in a dynamic, interdisciplinary, and 
participatory way, but it also shares some of their limitations in addressing some of environmental 
law’s most intractable issues. It adds some important new ideas and mechanisms to those earlier 
practices, however, that could facilitate more productive partnerships between applied 
environmental scientists, environmental lawyers, environmental policymakers, and affected 
stakeholders.  
II. The Evolving Practice of Translational Ecology  
Lawyers and scientists often see the world very differently, leading to what some 
commentators have referred to as a “culture clash” between the two disciplines.19 Scientists and 
lawyers use language in different ways, approach problems differently, and seek different goals.20 
Scientific language tends to be descriptive and explanatory; legal language tends to be normative 
and prescriptive. Scientists form plausible hypotheses and collect data to determine how well the 
data fit the hypothesis or the hypothesis explains the data,21 in an iterative process.22 Lawyers use 
 
17 See Robert W. Adler, The Coevolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 44 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
1 (2019).  
18 See id. at 5-9, 62-65. 
19 See STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994); SHEILA JASANOFF: SCIENCE AT 
THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 7 (1995) (identifying a “culture clash” between lawyers and 
scientists due to their fundamentally different enterprises); ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 5 (1998) (discussing a “clash of cultures” between law and 
social science); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW xiii (1999) 
(noting that lawyers and scientists see the world through different lenses); see, generally, Robert W. Adler, The 
Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in Environmental Law, 27 VERMONT L. REV. 249, 346-48 
(2003). 
20 See JASANOFF, supra note 19, at 7.  
21 See DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 26 (1st ed. 1988) (describing science as a “process by which scientists go from some 
knowledge to more knowledge”). 
22 See GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 8. 
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data to prove or disprove a particular fact or circumstance, with judges applying different burdens 
of proof depending on the nature of the process. Scientists accept doubt and uncertainty23 and 
remain open and flexible to accommodate evolving hypotheses and new or more robust or reliable 
data; lawyers and their clients seek some degree of certainty and stability to support new or existing 
institutions, business relationships, etc.24  
These differences can affect the relationship between lawyers and scientists in 
environmental law25 and in other areas of law. Lawyers often look to scientists to help them 
achieve a particular legal outcome, such as adoption of a regulation, issuance of a permit, or 
successful prosecution or defense of a lawsuit. Scientists expect the legal process to reflect and 
respond to changes in scientific knowledge and understanding, particularly in rapidly evolving 
fields of science such as ecology and other environmental sciences.26  
As one potential way to explain the relationship between law and science, in previous work 
I differentiated between “scientific knowledge” and “regulatory knowledge,” noting that they 
serve different but overlapping functions.27 Scientific knowledge improves our understanding of 
the world around us, and may have utilitarian or non-utilitarian value.28 Regulatory knowledge, by 
contrast, is knowledge or understanding with legal or regulatory significance.29 Regulatory 
knowledge includes scientific knowledge where it is relevant to regulatory decisions.30 It also 
transcends pure scientific knowledge, however, to include other forms of knowledge relevant to 
regulatory decisions, such as law, policy, economics, and social values.31  
This relationship between scientific knowledge and regulatory knowledge also suggests 
that each kind of knowledge feeds off the other in an iterative way. Law responds to advances in 
scientific knowledge by determining the degree to which that new knowledge is relevant to 
 
23 See Karen Locke, Karen Golden-Biddle & Martha S. Feldman, Perspective—Making Doubt Generative: Rethinking 
the Role of Doubt in the Research Process, 19 ORG. SCI. 907, 908-11 (2008). 
24 See FAIGMAN, supra note 19, at 51; GOLDBERG, supra note 19, at 22; JASANOFF, supra note 19, at 9. 
25 See, generally, Oliver A. Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 17 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163 (2003); Adler, supra note 19. 
26 See, e.g. THEO COLBORN, DIANNE DUMANOSKI & JOHN PETERSON MYERS, OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE 
THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURVIVAL? A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996) (critiquing the 
failure of the legal process to respond to scientific discoveries about the impact of endocrine disruptors on human 
health and the environment). 
27 See Adler, supra note 19, at 28-30.  
28 See id. at 28.  
29 See id.  
30 I use the term “regulatory” in the broadest sense. For example, it could encompass a decision on whether to legislate, 
and how; whether to adopt regulations, and in what form; and whether to allow or prohibit a particular activity.  
31 See Adler, supra note 19, at 28-29.  
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regulatory decisions and uses that knowledge to advance legal objectives.32 Science responds to 
new or evolving legal theories and requirements, such as a new or amended statute or regulation, 
by developing the scientific or technical basis or support for regulatory approaches or decisions.  
Translational ecology is one of several methods of applied science suggested to address 
these issues in the context of environmental policy. Predecessor practices have included 
conservation biology, adaptive management, ecosystem management, and watershed 
management. The discussion below first explains the basic principles of translational ecology as 
they have evolved thus far. It then compares and contrasts those principles with those developed 
through existing modes of interdisciplinary collaboration.  
A. Principles of Translational Ecology 
Schlesinger’s seminal editorial in Science proposed several basic principles to encourage 
ecologists to make their research more relevant to pressing environmental issues such as climate 
change, oil spills, and invasive species.33 His most basic plea was for ecologists to communicate 
ecological information accurately but in ways that various stakeholders34 can understand. That 
invitation, however, is coextensive with the general goal of better science communication shared 
by many scientific disciplines.35  
The somewhat more ambitious aspect of Schlesinger’s agenda was his call for “a new 
partnership between scientists and advocacy groups.”36 Although the term “advocacy” might 
suggest a focus on nonprofit environmental advocacy groups, his examples of existing 
collaborations were broader, including one partnership between ecologists and the advocacy group 
Earth Justice, and another between wetland ecologists and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
 
32 For example, lawyers might use improved scientific knowledge to prove or defend against elements of existing legal 
claims, or to test new legal claims. Likewise, new scientific knowledge might be used to advocate for or again new 
legislation or regulation.   
33 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.  
34 Schlesinger gave as examples of stakeholders “policy-makers, resource managers, public health officials, and the 
general public.” Id. He did not expressly include lawyers, but lawyers overlap some of the other categories.  
35 See Sara E. Brownell, Jordan V. Price, and Lawrence Steinman, Opinion, Science Communication to the General 
Public: Why We Need to Teach Undergraduate and Graduate Science Students this Skill as Part of Their Formal 
Scientific Training, 12 J. OF UNDERGRADUATE NEUROSCIENCE EDUC. E-6 , E-6 (2013) (beginning from the assumed 
premise that “[c]ommunication of science to the general public is increasingly recognized as a responsibility of 
scientists ….”). As noted by two later proponents of translational ecology: “Translational environmental science is 
not just about communicating better. It is also about listening better.” Mark W. Brunson & Michelle A. Baker, 
Translational Training for Tomorrow’s Environmental Scientists, 6 J. ENVIRON. STUD. SCI. 295, 296 (2016). For 
discussions of the field of science communication, see, generally, Dan M. Kahan, What is the “science of science 
communication?,” 14 J. OF SCI. COMMUNICATION 1 (2015); T.W. Burns, D.J. O’Connor, & S.M. Stockmayer, Science 
Communication: A Contemporary Definition, 12 PUBLIC UNDERSTAND. SCI. 183 (2003).  
36 Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 609.  
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Agency (EPA).37 Moreover, his generic call was to use “interdisciplinary teams of scientists, 
engineers, public health experts, and members of the end-user community,” without specifying a 
particular “side” of the end-user community.38 
Schlesinger’s real focus seems to be on the word “partnership” and the bidirectional 
communication needed to ensure that ecological science is both used and useful:  
Translational ecology requires constant two-way communications between stakeholders 
and scientists. It should continually alert scientists to aspects of the environment in need of 
study to produce new data, while clearly synthesizing what is already known from field 
studies and its relevance to policy. The partnership’s purpose should be to ensure that all 
stakeholders know the implications of scientific discoveries and understand their impact 
on alternative ecological diagnoses.39 
Thus, Schlesinger argued more for better, more inclusive, and more effective process rather than 
particular environmental policies. To the extent that he articulated a goal, it was to find a method 
to guide ecologists’ decisions on what to study to make their work more relevant to policy, and to 
help scientists communicate that information in understandable and policy-relevant ways.  
 Other researchers have pursued Schlesinger’s ideas in more depth, in part by convening 
multidisciplinary groups of professionals in fields such as ecology, environmental education, 
epidemiology and public health, science communication, science education, science policy, and 
social-ecological systems.40 These collaborations have added a number of key elements to the 
concept of translational ecology.  
 First, although this was perhaps implicit in Schlesinger’s claim, later proponents of 
translational ecology asserted that environmental research is often “ignored or incompletely 
applied,” but humbly placed the blame for those failures on scientists rather than the end users of 
the science.41 The main reason for that deficiency, they asserted, is a combination of the failure of 
scientists to make their findings “accessible and understandable to nonscientists,” and the failure 
of scientists to conduct the research most relevant to key policy decisions,42 citing an “imperfect 
 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 See Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 296-97. 
41 See id. at 295. 
42 Id. In fairness, blame for the science-policy gap might be shared between scientists and end users, whose own biases 
and disciplinary screens might consciously or unconsciously shield them from the implications of relevant scientific 
research. Similar factors might prevent end users from making key research needs known to environmental scientists. 
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match between the scientific world … and the management world.”43 Thus, they claim, 
stakeholders can play a key role in driving the ecological research agenda, and in translating 
research generated by scientists into policy.  
Second, ecology is only one of many disciplines in the broader realm of environmental 
science, all of which contribute knowledge and understanding relevant to environmental policy.44 
Those include chemistry, hydrology, political science, medicine “and other disciplines that could 
mitigate the negative effects of human activities and sustain natural systems.”45 The term 
“translational ecology” took hold in the scientific community so quickly that the term itself has 
not been broadened (for example, to “translational environmental science”).46 The proposed 
methodology, however, has now embraced a broader range of scientific disciplines related to the 
environment than ecology alone.47 
 Third, scholars subsequently offered somewhat broader definitions of translational ecology 
than Schlesinger first proposed. Brunson and Baker, for example, suggested:  
Translational ecology is boundary-spanning environmental science that leads to actionable 
research focused on maintaining or enhancing the resilience of social-ecological systems. 
Using an adaptive and iterative mode of inquiry, it extends beyond traditional scientific 
boundaries. It provides accessible tools and frameworks that allow exchanges of 
knowledge among ecologists and intended beneficiaries of their science, to promote mutual 
learning and a shared sense of its utility.48 
 
Because the goal of proponents of translational ecology is to improve practices within their own disciplines, it was 
perhaps appropriate for them to accept responsibility for their own contribution to the science-policy gap rather than 
deferring part of the responsibility to others.  
43 Carolyn A.F. Enquist, et al., Foundations of Translational Ecology, 15 FRONTIERS OF ECOL. & THE ENV’T., 541, 
545 (2017). 
44 Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 295. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 296. 
47 Although the lay public often considers the term “ecology” as synonymous with environmental sciences more 
generally, ecology is the science exploring the relationships between organisms and their environment, including 
patterns of abundance and distribution, and the flow of energy and materials through ecosystems. See Cary Inst. Of 
Ecosystem Studies, Definition of Ecology, available at https://www.caryinstitute.org/discover-ecology/definition-
ecology (presenting multiple definitions of ecology).  
48 Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 297. A convened group of ecologists, social scientists, and conservation 
professionals at the University of California-Santa Barbara later modified this definition further to “an approach that 
embodies intentional processes in which ecologists, stakeholders, and decision makers work collaboratively to develop 
ecological research via joint consideration of the sociological, ecological, and political contexts of an environmental 
problem that ideally results in improved environment-related decision making.” Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 542 
Panel 1, 544. This definition drops any specific substantive goal in favor of the more procedural objective of improved 
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This more explicitly calls for scientific research that is “actionable” and proposed a substantive 
goal of the resilience of social-ecological systems49 to Schlesinger’s largely procedural definition.  
Enquist et al. (in a group that also included Brunson) returned to a definition focused on a 
process leading to better decisions than a particular substantive goal:  
Translational ecology: an approach that embodies intentional processes in which 
ecologists, stakeholders, and decision makers work collaboratively, to develop ecological 
research via joint consideration of the sociological, ecological, and political contexts of an 
environmental problem that ideally results in improved environment-related decision 
making.50 
This group also articulated the end goal as “social and environmental sustainability,” however, 
recognizing the “coupled nature of social and ecological systems.”51 Yet another overlapping 
group researchers defined a translational ecologist as “a professional ecologist who engages 
across social, professional, and disciplinary boundaries in order to achieve practical 
environmental solutions to primary challenges.”52 The definition offered by this group falls 
somewhere in between, embracing the general goal of “practical environmental solutions” 
without establishing any particular substantive standard. Yet the analysis in the article also 
articulates the general goal of a “healthy environment.”53 
 Thus, in its nascent and rapidly evolving period, practitioners of translational ecology are 
struggling with the issue of whether the practice should have a substantive goal or a purely 
procedural objective of fostering better-informed environmental decisions. Ultimately, it seems 
most likely that the practice will settle on more procedural than particular substantive goals, with 
the trust that better process will lead to better decisions. Any other goal might challenge the 
objectivity that remains critical to the scientific process.54 Moreover, one of the main reasons 
 
decision making, under the postulate that “ecologically informed management and policy decisions are better 
decisions.” Id. at 543.  
49 The convened group later articulated the end goal as “social and environmental sustainability,” recognizing the 
“coupled nature of social and ecological systems.” See id.   
50 Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 542, Panel 1.  This group later articulated the end goal as “social and environmental 
sustainability,” recognizing the “coupled nature of social and ecological systems.” See Enquist, et al., supra note 39, 
at 541, 543.   
51 See id. at 541, 543.  
52 Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 587, 588.  
53 See id. at 588.  
54 See Enquist et al., supra note 43, at 545.  
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translational ecologists embrace collaborative process is the recognition that environmental 
problems involve competing value choices by diverse stakeholders,55 and that scientists need to 
be mindful of the distinction between science and personal values.56  
 Fourth, researchers have worked toward concrete practical steps to operationalize the idea 
of translational ecology. They have proposed development of a curriculum for graduate students 
to train them in the knowledge, skills, and attributes needed to practice transactional ecology.57  
They urge existing and new scientists to overcome incentives in academia to conduct purely 
theoretical research to obtain research funding and to move through the tenure track and up the 
academic ladder, rather than research that also has practical applications.58 In furtherance of this 
goal, researchers are developing lists of core competencies they deem useful to the practice of 
translational ecology.59 Other operational tools of translational ecology include more consumable 
modes of communicating research results than traditional scientific journal literature, including 
web-based dissemination and dialogues via social media or live collaborative processes.60 
Dialogue with stakeholders, they argue, can build trust in the integrity of the science and its 
relevance to policy. Given increased politicization of science,61 and recent research on social and 
political divides on the extent to which the public trusts scientists,62 building trust is a key goal. 63 
 Finally, subsequent researchers explained in more detail that translational ecology must 
recognize the “wicked” nature of environmental problems.64 Iterative collaborations between 
scientists and stakeholders are particularly important when decisions need to be made in the face 
of incomplete and contradictory information and shifting political and social contexts.65 Decisions 
must take into account the frequent mismatch between information needs and information 
 
55 See id.  
56 See Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 589. Issues that involve science but cannot be resolved by science alone have 
been referred to as “trans-scientific.” See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972). 
57 See Brunson & Baker, supra note 35, at 297-98. 
58 See id. at 296. 
59 See id. at 298 Table 2; Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 588.  
60 Enquist, et al., supra note 43, at 548. 
61 See Adler, supra note 17, at 2-5. 
62 See Pew Research Center, Trust and Mistrust in Americans’ Views of Scientific Experts, August 2019, available 
at file:///Users/u0028434/Downloads/PS_08.02.19_trust.in_.scientists_FULLREPORT_8.5.19.pdf. 
63 “Trust is a common theme associated with each of the TE principles, and is based on strong communication, frequent 
and ongoing engagement, and a commitment to participation throughout the science translation process.” Enquist et 
al., supra note 43, at 545.  
64 See Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 590. 
65 See id.  
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availability, and the mismatch between the time frame and scope of information needed and 
information available.66 
 In sum, the evolving field of translational ecology embraces the following principles: (1) 
accurate and understandable communication of environmental science research in ways the users 
of that information (“stakeholders”) can readily understand; (2) ongoing partnerships between 
environmental scientists and stakeholders, recognizing that solutions to pressing environmental 
problems involve values as well as science; (3) ongoing, multi-directional communication between 
scientists and stakeholders to build trust and to ensure that scientists engage in research that is 
actionable and relevant to important policy decisions and program implementation, and that 
recognizes the uncertainty in the information available to address complex environmental 
problems; (4) interdisciplinary scientific collaboration to explore connections between the 
implications of each field of scientific research to important environmental problems; and, in some 
but not all definitions, (5) a substantive goal of research that promotes social and ecological 
resilience and sustainability.67  
B. Relationship to Earlier Concepts of the Law-Science Interface  
None of the individual concepts of translational ecology identified above are entirely new, 
and the field of environmental law has not been blind to those principles. Environmental scientists 
have identified other approaches to applied ecology as relevant to environmental and natural 
resources law, such as conservation biology,68 adaptive management,69 and resilience theory.70 
Moreover, natural resource managers have been working for decades on interdisciplinary, 
collaborative processes through the rubrics of ecosystem management and watershed 
management.71 Although Schlesinger’s seminal editorial advocating for translational ecology 
linked the idea to the parallel discipline of translational medicine rather than earlier versions of 
applied ecology, subsequent proponents have identified its similarities to conservation biology, 
adaptive management, and other practices in applied ecology.72 A preliminary question, then, is 
whether translational ecology poses a sufficiently new paradigm to warrant attention. Although a 
 
66 See Enquist et al., supra note 43, at 545.  
67 One working group categorized the principles of translational ecology as collaboration, engagement, commitment, 
communication, process, and decision-framing. See id. at 544.  
68 See infra Part II.B.1. 
69 See infra Part II.B.2. 
70 See infra Part II.B.3. 
71 See infra Part II.B.4. 
72 See Enquist et al., supra note 43 at 542, 543; Schwartz et al., supra note 6, at 591. 
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complete treatment is not possible here, the following explores the main similarities and 
differences between these related concepts. 
1. Conservation biology 
Conservation biology as a recognized discipline dates to the late 1970s,73 and one 
prominent conservation biologist cited its “flowering in the mid-1980s with the founding of the 
Society for Conservation Biology.”74 It reflected dissatisfaction by some scientists with 
“traditional” resource management disciplines focused on maximization of extractive resource 
values (such as timber, livestock grazing, wildlife and fisheries) at the expense of biodiversity 
conservation and ecosystem protection.75 Conservation biologists recognized that, like the more 
utilitarian resource management disciplines that preceded them, their focus was also “mission-
oriented”, but guided by a different set of values and priorities.76  
Conservation biology shares several attributes with translational ecology. It proposes the 
purposeful application of science rather than purely “curiosity-driven” science. It acknowledges 
the connection between science and values. Because it requires conservation across broad 
geographic regions and affects a wide range of human activities, it is interdisciplinary.77 Its call 
for ecosystem protection across political, public-private, and land management agency boundaries 
requires collaboration and cooperation.78 Given the complexity and uncertainty of biodiversity 
protection, it also embraces principles of iterative adaptive management.79 
There are a number of ways, however, in which conservation biology differs from 
translational ecology. Most notably, conservation biology embraces particular substantive goals 
rather than viewing science as one tool in making decisions influenced by other values and 
disciplines as well. It promotes science to advance biodiversity conservation on a broad scale.80 It 
 
73 See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology as they Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 893 (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994). 
74 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894. For broader perspectives on conservation biology, see generally, Michel E. Soule, 
What is Conservation Biology, 35 BIOSCIENCE 727 (1985); CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Soule & Bruce Wilcox, eds. 1980). 
75 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894-95. 
76 See id. at 895, 899. 
77 See id. at 894-95 (identifying the need to include biologists, geographers, sociologists, economists, lawyers, political 
scientists, artists, educators, and others). 
78 See id. at 907 (calling for “cooperation among agencies and landowners and coordination of inventory, research, 
monitoring, and management activities”). 
79 See id. at 907; infra Part II.B.4. 
80 See Noss, supra note 73, at 894-95. 
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embraces a philosophy of conservative resource exploitation in the face of scientific uncertainty 
about the potential impacts of human development.81 It reflects the growing realization that 
ecosystems are dynamic and unpredictable, and should be managed accordingly.82 It articulates 
specific principles of management and reserve design for target species, and ecosystem 
management to accomplish its stated goals.83  Although acknowledging the interdisciplinary nature 
of environmental decisions, one key conservation biology proponent argued that “biology must 
determine the bottom line.”84 
Thus, one might characterize conservation biology as advocating substantive goals of 
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem protection while using procedural principles 
(interdisciplinary collaboration; cooperation across agencies, landownership, and levels of 
government) to advance those goals. In short, it is directional. It endorses a set of ecological goals 
rather than embracing a process to involve multiple disciplines and stakeholders to achieve 
consensus on substantive goals. It assumes those goals to be valid regardless of what society has 
determined through existing laws and regulations. As one legal scholar has noted, the law often 
runs counter to principles of biodiversity conservation.85 Natural resource management laws  
necessarily consider multiple resource goals and values, and balance them against one another, 
contrary to the idea advanced by conservation biology that biodiversity preservation should 
transcend all other priorities in managing natural resources.86 Although some environmental 
statutes advance this goal through absolutist mandates, particularly the Endangered Species Act,87 
on a broader scale the goals of conservation biology would require significant changes in existing 
natural resource and environmental law and policy.88 
Although translational ecology and conservation biology share some common elements, 
then, translational ecology is conceptualized quite differently. Rather than embracing particular 
 
81 See id. at 896, 898-99. 
82 See id. at 893. 
83 See id. at 900-07. 
84 Id. at 899. 
85 See Keiter, supra note 73, at 911.  
86 See id. at 912.  
87 16 U.S.C. § 531 et seq.; see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (holding that the protective 
obligations imposed on federal agencies in the ESA are mandatory and absolute); Amy Sinden, In Defense of 
Absolutism: Combatting the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005) . 
88 See Keiter, supra note 73, at 912. A quarter century ago, Professor Keiter argued that “the legal system [was] edging. 
Slowly yet perceptibly, toward endorsing biological diversity as a key consideration in managing the public domain.” 
Id. at 933. Whether or not that was true at the time, it appears that the legal system has not moved much closer to that 
goal since then, and arguably it has been moving in the opposite direction in recent years. 
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substantive goals and using process tools to advance them, translational ecology assumes that 
scientists can improve environmental decisions and results through collaborative processes that 
involve other disciplines and stakeholders in shaping substantive goals. 
2. Adaptive management  
Environmental scientists developed adaptive management during roughly the same period 
as conservation biology.89 It is premised on the idea that ecosystems are complex, and that it is 
difficult to predict the impacts of human activities on the environment.90 To help resource 
managers plan and implement restoration, protection, and other management actions that are most 
likely to achieve their intended results, adaptive management evaluates the impacts of management 
efforts through specifically designed experiments. Adaptive management is “learning by doing,” 
but approaches range from trial-and-error, to basing management actions on the best known 
information at a single point in time, to a more considered series of “test” management actions 
coupled with carefully designed assessment efforts to measure and analyze the actual impacts of 
the action.91 Management efforts can then be revised based on the results of the experiments in an 
iterative fashion, ideally until satisfactory results are achieved.92 
Like conservation biology and translational ecology, adaptive management applies science 
in ways that improve the results of resource management efforts, rather than engaging in purely 
curiosity-driven of theoretical research. Also like both conservation biology and translational 
ecology, adaptive management calls for collaboration between scientists, resource managers, and 
other stakeholders. Because adaptive management is an iterative process, it requires bi-directional 
communication between scientists and resource managers to design and implement the 
experiments to evaluate the effects of the management actions taken. It also requires scientists to 
 
89 See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).  
90 See C.J. Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060, 
2060 (1990). 
91 See id. See, also, Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 933, 
934-35 (2013) (describing variants on active adaptive management). 
92 The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (GCDAMP) is a classic example in which, pursuant to 
federal statute, see Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, the Bureau of Reclamation 
and other cooperating agencies and scientists have engaged in a series of experiments designed to test the impact of 
revised flow patterns from Glen Canyon Dam on the ecosystem of the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon 
below. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, 
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/amp/index.html; see, generally, ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER 
ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY 137-70 (2007).  For another example, see Lance Gunderson & 
Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POLICY SCIENCES 
323 (2006). 
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communicate effectively the results of experiments assessing the impacts of those management 
activities. It is not clear, however, that adaptive management seeks a particular substantive goal 
aside from improving the understanding and hence the effectiveness of resource management 
actions.93 The results of those actions—the definition of “success”—still must be determined 
through independent legal or other decision-making process.  
Thus, adaptive management resembles translational ecology quite closely, but within a 
narrower range of scientific endeavors. Adaptive management involves a specific kind of 
collaboration between scientists and resource managers to guide the implementation of particular 
resource management activities or programs. It requires effective bidirectional communication and 
collaboration but has not developed broad-based academic curricula or training programs to build 
an “adaptive management workforce.” Translational ecology encourages scientists on a broader 
scale to engage with consumers of scientific information to improve the usefulness of their 
scientific research to resource managers and others, and to plan their research agendas to maximize 
the relevance of that research. It is also embarking on a comprehensive education program to train 
the next generation of environmental scientists to work more closely and effectively with the end 
users of their scientific work.   
Unlike conservation biology, for which legal scholarship is scarce, legal scholars have 
devoted significant attention to the impact of adaptive management on environmental law.94 Some 
scholars believe it can be transformative, at least in some contexts.95 Others are somewhat more 
skeptical, exploring the limitations of adaptive management96 and describing its benefits in more 
informational terms.97 A key question, then, is whether the idea of translational ecology is 
sufficiently broader in scope to suggest more comprehensive shifts in environmental law. 
3. Resilience theory  
Resilience theory is a more recent and logical extension of the paradigm shift in the science 
of ecology that animated both conservation biology and adaptive management.98 Because 
 
93 See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455 (2011). 
94 For a detailed discussion of much of the literature, see Biber, supra note 91. 
95 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1 (2018) (proposing statutory changes to accommodate adaptive management in administrative law). 
96 See, e.g., Biber, supra note 91, at 933-34 (questioning whether adaptive management warrants a “paradigm shift” 
in environmental law), 939-56 (exploring the limits  of adaptive management); Eric Biber, Craig and Ruhl’s Model 
Adaptive Management Act: Some Proposed Amendments, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 257 (2014. )   
97 See Doremus, supra note 93. 
98 See, generally, BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (2006). 
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ecosystems are dynamic rather than static, in ways that are not always easy to predict,99 
conservation biology proposed two major management reforms. The first is caution in the face of 
uncertainty, essentially arguing for less human disturbance of ecosystems where the impacts of 
that development are understood imperfectly.100 The second, related to the idea of ecosystem 
management described in the following subsection, is more holistic efforts to protect ecosystems 
on a larger scale, and across ownership and management boundaries.101 Maintaining the equivalent 
of static zoos within limited protected areas does not adequately preserve and protect “nature” in 
its dynamic sense. Adaptive management responded to ecosystem uncertainty and change in a 
more procedural way, in which careful scientific experimentation is used to guide resource agency 
actions and decisions in the face of that uncertainty and dynamism.102  
Resilience theory has taken one step further the ecological concept that ecosystems 
undergo continuous change even absent human disturbance. It proposes a shift from the 
substantive goal of protecting “the balance of nature,” which implies a static ideal condition, to 
one of protecting ecosystem resilience.103 That suggests maintaining ecosystems not at some 
prescribed notion of a “perfect” or “natural” state, which is always influenced by human values,104 
but rather in a condition that maintains the natural ability of ecosystems to change. Resilience, 
however, suggests that natural change occurs at rates and within bounds that preserve ecosystem 
structure and function. It provides a different substantive goal for ecological protection consistent 
with the newer paradigm that ecosystems exist in a constant state of flux, but that too much change 
or too rapid change can impair ecosystem function.  
Resilience theory has profound implications for environmental management and 
environmental law, which others have explored extensively.105 For example, it could suggest a 
different way to conceptualize the stated objective of the Clean Water Act to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”106 Likewise, it could have 
 
99 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra Part II.B.1. 
101 See id. 
102 See supra Part II.B.2. 
103 See, e.g., Craig R. Allen, et al., Managing for Resilience, 17 WILDLIFE BIOLOGY 337 (2011).  
104 See RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 92, at 79-103.  
105 See MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017). See, also, Resilience & Environmental Law 
Reform Symposium, 87 NEBRASKA L. REV. No. 4 (2009). 
106 33 U.S.C. §1251(a); see Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental 
Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J. LAW & POL’Y 139, 142-50 (2010). 
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implications for how we interpret to goal of the Endangered Species Act to preserve and protect 
threatened and endangered species and “the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend….”107 
Unlike translational ecology, however, resilience theory is not a proposed procedural 
framework to guide the future training and work of ecologists and other environmental scientists. 
It is a new or revised substantive paradigm in the science of ecology, albeit an extremely important 
one, and one that might help guide the practice of translational ecology, along with the other factors 
and values that the collaborative process of translational ecology might generate.  
4. Ecosystem and watershed management 
For many decades, resource managers and legal scholars have recognized that effective 
natural resource and environmental management cannot be accomplished by focusing in isolation 
on individual resources and their associated values (land, air, water, timber, forage, wildlife, etc.), 
individual land areas (federal, state, local, private) or water bodies (streams, rivers, lakes, wetlands, 
estuaries), or separate management agencies or other interested parties. That realization led to the 
development of the fields of ecosystem management108 and watershed management,109 which are 
similar practices applied with a different bioregional focus.110 
Ecosystem and watershed management resemble translational ecology in their reliance on 
collaboration among natural resource and environmental management agencies at multiple 
governmental levels, scientists in multiple disciplines, natural resource users, and other 
stakeholders. Ecosystem and watershed management programs use those collaborative processes 
to set restoration, protection, and management goals for the defined program area based on 
 
107 16 U.S.C. §1531(b).  
108 See RICHARD O. BROOKS, ROSS JONES & ROSS A. VIRGINIA, LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM 
REGIME (2002); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance, 14 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVT. 156 (Winter 2000); Robert B. Keiter, National Parks, Ecosystem Management, and the Law, 15 
J. Energy, Nat. Resources & Envt’l L. 249 (1995); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law 
of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994). 
109 See Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 Wm. & Mary. J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 379 
(2000); Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watershed and the Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging 
the Great Divides, 25 Wm. & Mary. J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 1 (2000); Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed 
Protection, 25 Envt’l L. 973 (1995); William Goldfarb: Watershed Management, Slogan or Solution, 21 Boston Coll. 
Envt’l. Aff. L. Rev 483 (1994). For a more comprehensive list, see ROBERT W. ADLER. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, & 
NOAH D. HALL, WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 793 (2d ed. 
2018).  
110 Ecosystem management focuses on terrestrial ecosystems as the relevant geographic area within which to manage 
wildlife and other natural resources, although water bodies are components of those ecosystems. Watershed 
management focuses on watersheds as the relevant geographic focus within which to manage resources related to 
aquatic ecosystem health, although land use is necessarily a component of those efforts. 
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multiple factors, including applicable laws and regulations, relevant science, stakeholder input, 
and to the extent the applicable law allows, relevant social, economic, and other factors reflecting 
community values and needs.111 Thus, like translational ecology, ecosystem and watershed 
management are more procedural than substantive conceptually,112 relying on the process and its 
participants to define substantive program goals. As was true for adaptive management, however, 
skeptics note that such process reforms can have limitations when political, social, economic or 
other non-scientific factors predominate in efforts to resolve divisive environmental issues.113 
Environmental science aids ecosystem and watershed management processes by 
monitoring to establish environmental baseline conditions, informing goal-setting by helping to 
define healthy and resilient ecological conditions, using adaptive management to evaluate what 
actions and practices are likely to achieve those goals, and conducting additional research and 
monitoring to assess the degree to which program goals are met. Moreover, ecosystem and 
watershed management programs often have specific processes designed to guide appropriate and 
action-oriented scientific research agendas. All of this requires effective multi-directional 
communication among groups of scientists in different disciplines and between scientists, 
decision-makers and stakeholders.  
Ecosystem, and watershed management programs, however, differ from translational 
ecology in their source, focus, and defined purposes. They are designed and organized not by the 
scientific community, but by resource management agencies, community partnerships, or other 
diverse entities whose main focus is to improve management and protection of the target 
ecosystems or watersheds.114 Scientists are one of many key communities of participants in the 
process. Translational ecology is somewhat of a mirror image of those processes, in which the 
scientific community engages in communication and collaboration with end users to help define 
and ensure the relevance of its research agenda.  
 
111 See, e.g., Adler (Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection), supra note 109, at 1104-06; Keiter (Beyond the 
Boundary Line), supra note 108, at 323-25; BROOKS et al., supra note 108, at 261-79. 
112 Neither is entirely procedural, because they each rest on the substantive premise that effective land and water 
restoration, protection, and management is best achieved within logical environmentally-defined areas.  
113 See James L. Huffman, Comprehensive River Basin Management: The Limits of Collaborative, Stakeholder-Based, 
Water Governance, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117 (2009); John D. Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River 
Collaborative Watershed Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 559 (2001) (arguing that the 
Platte River watershed process was a waste of time and money); Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience 
May Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the Everglades, 87 NEB. 
L. REV. 893 (2009) (critiquing Everglades and Grand Canyon watershed-based restoration efforts). 
114 See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of watershed management programs under the Clean Water Act. 
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This distinction may be narrow and, in some cases potentially semantic,115 but it can also 
be important. Ecosystem and watershed programs are tightly focused on the defined geographic 
and programmatic reaches of those efforts, and enlist scientific help in defining, achieving, and 
monitoring progress toward program goals. It reflects one way that scientists can use translational 
ecology principles to set research goals and to communicate research results both effectively and 
usefully. Not all scientists will want to limit their research to particular geographically-defined 
programs, however, and might reverse the process to identify broader research efforts that might 
help with broader research management and environmental protection programs and goals.  
5. What does translational ecology add?  
Each of the above concepts of applied ecology share various attributes with the evolving 
idea of translational ecology, and with one another. Some are more substantive in nature and others 
more procedural. Some are more value laden, beginning with particular environmental goals, and 
others rely on a process to define those goals in collaboration with other interested parties. Each, 
however, relies to some extent on the core goals of translational ecology to make environmental 
science more relevant to ongoing resource management programs and decisions, and to better 
translate the results of environmental science into effective and constructive action. It is possible, 
then, to critique translational ecology as just another variation on existing themes of applied 
ecology. If so, it would not add significantly to the overall goal of improving the role of 
environmental science in environmental policy, and environmental law.  
There are a number of ways, however, in which translational ecology transcends each of 
its predecessors. Conservation biology and resilience theory are both largely substantive ideas 
directed at achieving specific environmental results. Each might rely on collaboration with various 
end users of science to achieve those results, but they are directional and goal-oriented in nature. 
An exercise in translational ecology ultimately might adopt or implement principles of 
conservation biology or resilience theory, but the main point of translational ecology is to 
collaborate with end users of science to determine what those goals should be in particular 
contexts, and to conduct scientific research most relevant and useful to those goals. 
Adaptive management, ecosystem management, and watershed management, by contrast, 
are more similar to translational ecology in their reliance on collaborative process to help define 
 
115 For example, scientists might practice translational ecology by engaging with a new or existing ecosystem or 
watershed management program.  
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substantive program goals. Those programs operate, however, within specific program contexts. 
Translational ecology seeks to broaden the idea of collaboration between scientists and end users 
with no constraints regarding the geography of focus, or the kinds of environmental programs or 
issues involved. In short, it appears to be the broadest conceptualization of applied ecology 
identified to date.  
Taken as a whole, then, the principles of translational ecology have the potential to advance 
the goal of better integration of science, law and policy beyond what previous efforts have 
achieved. That necessarily suggests that it has the potential to improve the manner in which 
environmental science and environmental law interact. Because translational ecologists recognize 
that science is only one of many considerations that drive environmental law and policy, however, 
they should also understand that it may face the same kinds of limitations that earlier modes of 
applied ecology have faced in resolving politically divisive environmental issues. 
III. Opportunities for Translational Ecology in Environmental Law 
Based on the foregoing summary of the principles of translational ecology,116 it seems 
facially apparent that translational ecology has implications for the implementation of 
environmental law. Proponents of the practice emphasize the relationship between environmental 
science and environmental policy. Some of that analysis identifies law as one of the areas of 
knowledge that translational ecologists should understand in order to practice in the field.117 
Science has always been integral to environmental law because scientific research most often is 
the source of information identifying environmental problems, helping to define environmental 
restoration and protection efforts, and helping to identify solutions and to monitor and assess their 
effectiveness.118  
That linkage, however, does not identify or explain the actual relationship between 
translational ecology and environmental law. Existing environmental statutes might provide 
specific opportunities to test or practice translational ecology in the context of new or ongoing 
environmental programs. Those opportunities are explored in this Part, using three of the major 
 
116 See supra Part II.A. 
117 See supra note 10.  
118 See, e.g., David E. Adelman, The Art of the Unsolvable: Locating the Vital Center of Science for Environmental 
Law and Policy, 37 ENVT’L L. 935, 939-56 (2007); Deborah M. Brosnan, Science, Law, and the Environment: The 
Making of a Modern Discipline, 37 ENVT’L L. 987, 993-99, 939-56 (2007).  
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federal environmental statutes as nonexclusive examples.119 Moreover, the fundamental concepts 
and goals of translational ecology suggest that there may be ways in which environmental law and 
related aspects of administrative law might evolve to accommodate or facilitate translational 
ecology.120 Those issues are explored in Part IV.  
A. The Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”)121 provides good opportunities for translational ecology 
because the Act focuses so heavily and fundamentally on ecological integrity.122 Nearly a half 
century after Congress adopted this language and its many implementing programs, the agencies 
charged with implementing the statute123 still struggle with a number of key definitional and 
implementation challenges that implicate ecology and other environmental sciences. Translational 
ecology can help address those challenges at three levels of statutory implementation: (1) defining 
the scope and goals of the statute; (2) implementing broad statutory programs more robustly and 
holistically, with improved focus on the overriding objective of the statute; and (3) restoring and 
protecting individual water bodies.  
1. Defining the CWA’s Objective and Scope  
The opening sentence of the CWA establishes a broad and ambitious national objective 
that begs for scientific aid in its interpretation: “The objective of this [Act] is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”124 Interpreting 
 
119 This is not an exclusive set of examples. Other environmental laws and programs, including applicable common 
law, could also suggest opportunities for translational ecology. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, often known as “Superfund”), establishes liability for 
“damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources ….” 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(C). Natural resource 
damage assessments conducted by government trustees to support such liability claims, see id. §9607(f), require 
extensive analysis by environmental scientists to identify and characterize the damage, and collaboration with 
economists and others to monetize the damage identified. See State of Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing regulations governing natural resource damage assessments).  
120 This reciprocal relationship is a further example of what I explored elsewhere as the coevolutionary relationship 
between environmental law and science. See Adler, supra note 17; see, also, J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of 
Virtue: Maxims for the Co-Evolution of Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063 (2007). 
121 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. The CWA was the example I used in presenting this thesis initially to the Society of 
Freshwater Science. See supra note *. 
122 See Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and 
Biological Integrity, 33 ENVT’L L. 29, 32-46 (2003).  
123 At the federal level, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has principle responsibility for implementing 
the Act, and for overseeing implementation of state responsibilities. See 33 U.S.C. §§1251(d), 1361. The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (ACE) has responsibility for one key permitting program, see id. §1344; and states have primary 
responsibility for the water quality standards program, see id. §1313(c), and the option of implementing both of the 
Act’s key water pollution permitting programs. See id. §§1342(b), 1344(g)-(i).  
124 Id. §1251(a).  
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the meaning of this sentence requires elucidation of at least two key terms. First, what did Congress 
mean by “chemical, physical, and biological integrity?” Second, what are the “Nation’s waters” 
that are subject to the statutory objective? 
a. What is “chemical, physical, and biological integrity?” 
Although the CWA contains 25 definitions of its key terms,125 nowhere does the statute 
define the word “integrity”, either alone or in the context of the phrase “chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity.”126 This is a deceptively difficult issue. For example, although the CWA 
includes a subsidiary goal to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters from 
external human sources as one means of achieving the Act’s primary objective,127 “chemical 
integrity” cannot mean the absence of chemical substances in water bodies. Entirely unimpaired 
rivers, lakes, and other water bodies naturally contain a range of substances that support aquatic 
life—or at least do not impair aquatic life in the natural world.128 Moreover, chemical substances 
reach water bodies from human and other sources not subject to the zero-discharge goal.129  
Scientists have long been a pivotal part of the effort to define water quality standards 
dictating levels of chemical constituents in water bodies that may harm aquatic life, human uses, 
or other important values.130 Similarly, aquatic ecologists have developed systems of metrics to 
compare impaired water bodies with relatively unimpaired reference systems to measure the 
degree to which human change has adversely affected the integrity of the water body, which EPA 
 
125 33 U.S.C. §1362. 
126 There are explanations in the legislative history of the 1972 CWA that provide some guidance as to what Congress 
meant by “integrity”. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 at 76-77 (1972) (explaining integrity as “a concept that refers to a 
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained”); S. REP. NO. 92-50 at 12, 15 (1972), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3678-79 (indicating that ‘[m]aintenance of such integrity requires that … the 
aquatic ecosystem will return to a state functionally identical to the original”). See, also, Adler, supra note 122, at 44-
46. 
127 Id. §§1251(a)(1).  
128 See, e.g., DAVID A. CHIN, WATER QUALITY ENGINEERING IN NATURAL SYSTEMS: FATE AND TRANSPORT 
PROCESSES IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (2013) §§2.1 (describing dissolved oxygen levels necessary to support 
aquatic life), 2.3.4 (characterizing nutrients as “essential elements to sustain growth and life function” at acceptable 
levels). 
129 These include both anthropogenic “nonpoint sources” of pollution, see 33 U.S.C. §1329, infra Part III.A.3, and 
natural sources such as erosion and sedimentation and air deposition. See Frank J. Humenik, Michael D. Smolen, & 
Steven A. Dressing, Pollution from Nonpoint Sources: Where We Are and Where We Should Go, 21 ENVIRON. SCI. 
TECH. 737 (1987); CHIN, supra note 128, §1.2 (2013) (characterizing sources of water pollution).  
130 See 33 U.S.C. §§1313(c) (requiring states or EPA to establish water quality standards for water bodies), 1314(a) 
(requiring EPA to adopt advisory water quality criteria to guide in the promulgation of legally-effective water quality 
standards). EPA has published an extensive set of “water quality criteria documents” discussing the impacts of specific 
pollutants on human health and environmental quality. See U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Historical Water Quality Criteria 
Documents, available at: https://www.epa.gov/wqc/historical-water-quality-criteria-documents;  
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and states have used to develop biological water quality criteria, or biocriteria.131 Indeed, EPA 
convened a meeting between agency officials and scientists early in the implementation history of 
the CWA,132 which might be characterized as an example of translational science before 
Schlesinger had coined the term.  
Despite this extensive work on water quality criteria, defining and measuring the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s water bodies is an incomplete and ongoing task133 
that matches the concept of translational ecology well. It is inherently interdisciplinary because 
aquatic ecosystem health involves so many different factors studied by a range of scientific 
disciplines.134 It is value-laden because zero anthropogenic change is impossible in a modern 
world, meaning that EPA and state decisionmakers, with input from other stakeholders, must make 
decisions about the degree of impairment to water body integrity is acceptable.135 That should be 
informed by relevant scientific research, and effective bidirectional communication between 
scientists, agency officials, and interested members of the public.  
b. What are the “Nation’s waters??  
Perhaps the most longstanding and bitterly fought dispute regarding CWA statutory 
interpretation has involved the fundamental issue of which water bodies are subject to the Act’s 
regulatory jurisdiction.136 Unlike the term “integrity”, the CWA’s definitions do attempt to address 
this issue,137 but in a way that has confounded both the two federal agencies charged with 
 
131 See, U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Biological Water Quality Criteria: https://www.epa.gov/wqc/biological-water-
quality-criteria; see generally, Adler, supra note 17.  
132 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE INTEGRITY OF WATER: A SYMPOSIUM (R. Kent Ballentine & Leonard J. 
Guarraia eds. 1977).  
133 New forms of water pollution are being discovered continuously. See, e.g., Jennifer Bjorhus, Great Lakes’ Latest 
Pollution Threat is Microplastics, The Star Tribune, Aug, 12, 2019, available at: http://www.startribune.com/lakes-
latest-pollution-threat-microplastics/535744532/. 
134 As just a few examples, aquatic toxicologists study the impacts of contaminants on fish and other aquatic life, while 
human toxicologists assess the effects of pollutants on human health due to exposure from fish consumption, drinking 
water, or recreational contact. Geomorphologists study the physical and ecological impacts of changes in erosion and 
sedimentation due to human development in watersheds. Aquatic ecologists characterize the species composition and 
trophic structures of aquatic ecosystems to determine the extent to which they have been modified by human activities 
and natural change. Etc.  
135 See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding state decisions to allow higher concentrations 
of dioxin in water bodies based on different risk choices). 
136 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism, Regulatory Architecture, and the Clean Water Rule: Seeking Consensus on the 
Waters of the United States, 46 ENVT’L L. 277 (2015). The legal debate regarding the statute’s geographic jurisdiction 
dates to just a few years after enactment of the 1972 CWA. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 
392 F.Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1975) (invalidating ACE’s definition of “waters of the United States” as unduly narrow). 
137 See 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas”). 
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implementing this aspect of the statute138 as well as the courts.139 Nearly a half century after 
Congress enacted the CWA in its basic current form,140 the battle over the statute’s geographic 
reach remains unresolved.141 
The relative extent to which the jurisdictional scope of the CWA is a matter of science or 
a matter of law has ebbed and flowed. In its first major effort to construe the jurisdictional reach 
of the CWA, Justice White wrote the majority opinion highlighting the role of science in 
determining which water bodies were properly subject to the Act’s regulation, bounded by the 
language and goals of the Act, and deferring to the sound scientific judgment of the agencies in 
interpreting and applying that science:  
In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the [Clean Water] 
Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise boundaries to regulable waters, 
the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between  waters and their adjacent 
wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be 
defined as waters under the Act.142 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,143 
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited the reach of CWA jurisdiction on more purely legal 
grounds to exclude non-adjacent wetlands that ACE had found subject to CWA regulation solely 
because they provided habitat for migratory birds.144 In doing so, he argued that the word 
 
138 Although Congress vested primary responsibility for implementing the statute to EPA, see supra note 123, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers implements section 404 of the statute, id. §1344, governing the discharge of dredged and 
fill material into jurisdictional waters. Thus, historically the two agencies have tried to speak with one voice regarding 
interpretation of the Act’s jurisdictional provisions. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S. Envtl. Prot.  Agency, Final 
Rule, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (June 29, 2015) 
(promulgating joint amended rule).  
139 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (generating 4-1-4) split regarding the meaning of “waters of 
the United States,” and discussing earlier efforts to construe the provision).  
140 The 1972 statute, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), was nominally an amendment to earlier federal water 
pollution control legislation, see Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 750, Pub. L. No. 80-85, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), 
but restructured the operation of the law almost entirely. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
§4.1A.4.a (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
20 YEARS LATER 5-19 (1993).  
141 See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S. Envtl. Prot.  Agency, Proposed Rule, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of 
the United States—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules” 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (July 27, 2017) (withdrawing Obama 
Administration’s Clean Water Rule and signaling intent to promulgate replacement rule); U.S. Dep’t of Defense, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed Rule, Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, Feb. 14, 
2019; note 139 supra (noting absence of Supreme Court majority on the issue). 
142 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985). 
143 531 U.S. 539 (2001). 
144 Id. at 174. 
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“navigable” in the CWA must be given some import,145 and that deference to the agency’s legal 
and scientific discretion was not appropriate where the agency action “invokes the outer limits of 
Congress’ power.”146 
 In Rapanos v. United States, some members of the Supreme Court went even further in 
favoring legal over scientific factors to limit the reach of CWA jurisdiction, or arguably in crafting 
their own “scientific” solutions to the problem. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, penned a minority opinion invoking Justice White’s earlier decision to defer 
to reasonable executive branch interpretations of legislative intent based on scientific and other 
factors.147 Justice Scalia, however, writing for a plurality, determined that the meaning of “waters 
of the United States” should be determined by reference to a standard dictionary definition rather 
than scientific analysis.148 He further rejected the agency’s reliance on ecological factors to 
delineate waters of the United States except for those waters directly abutting traditional navigable 
waters.149 Justice Kennedy, in an opinion concurring in the judgment,150 acknowledged the 
scientific basis for ACE’s wetlands delineation manual,151 and critiqued the plurality’s reliance on 
dictionary definitions as making “little practical sense.”152 In his effort to reconcile the statutory 
text and purpose with the scientific reality that pollution of non-adjacent water bodies can 
adversely affect traditional navigable waters, however, Justice Kennedy pronounced a different 
test, that CWA jurisdiction requires a “significant nexus” between the water body in question and 
navigable waters.153 Thus, a bare majority of the Court recognized in some way the need to 
integrate law and science to ascertain an appropriate interpretation of the CWA’s geographic 
 
145 Id. at 172. 
146 Id. 
147 547 U.S. at 788, 793. 
148 Id. at 732-33. Justice Scalia acknowledged that there might be more “scientifically precise” approaches, at least in 
the context of ephemeral and intermittent streams, but declined to rely on that science. See id. at 732 n.5. 
149 Id. at 741-42. 
150 Lower courts have split on whether to apply Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion because it articulated the 
narrowest grounds on which the case could be decided under the test established in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977), or the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208-10 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining circuit split but finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue because jurisdiction was proper under 
both tests). 
151 547 U.S. at 761-62. See, also, id. at 775 (citing Office of Technology Assessment report on relationship between 
wetland use and regulation); 777-78 (citing other scientific literature). 
152 Id. at 768-70. 
153 Id. at 779. 
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scope. Some scientists have subsequently critiqued the “significant nexus” concept, however, as 
itself being ungrounded in applicable science.154  
 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s divided opinion in Rapanos, EPA convened agency 
and other scientists to conduct a comprehensive synthesis of the published scientific literature 
describing and explaining the connectivity of streams and wetlands to downstream waters.155 As 
explained by one if the report’s authors,156 Dr. Laurie Alexander, the effort was designed to 
synthesize the applicable scientific literature with recent case law to support amended agency 
rulemaking, and to address stakeholder concerns about the complexity and uncertainty landowners 
faced in determining which waters were subject to CWA jurisdiction.157 Indeed, Alexander 
depicted the feedback loops involved in revising CWA regulations in response to evolving case 
law and evolving science.158 
 The 2015 synthesis report process could be labeled an example of translational ecology, 
but it also illustrates the potential limitations of the concept. It involved a multidisciplinary group 
of scientists working together and with agency policy officials to help inform the regulatory 
process by synthesizing and communicating the applicable science clearly for the public and 
agency officials and explaining its relevance to the necessary regulatory decisions.159 It involved 
 
154 See, e.g., John M. Marton et al., Geographically Isolated Wetlands are Important Biogeographical Reactors on 
the Landscape, 65 BIOSCIENCE 408, 408-11 (2015) (explaining geochemical and ecological connections between 
isolated wetlands and traditional navigable waters even absent close hydrological connectivity); David M. Mushet et 
al., Geographically Isolated Wetlands: Rethinking a Misnomer, 35 Wetlands 423 (2015) (critiquing the scientific 
validity of distinguishing between “isolated” and other wetlands in the context of the Rapanos decision). 
155 U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO 
DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (January 2015) (hereinafter 
“SYNTHESIS REPORT”). 
156 See id. at xiii.  
157 Laurie B. Alexander, Science at the Boundaries: Scientific Support for the Clean Water Rule, 34 FRESHWATER 
SCIENCE 1588 (2015). 
158 See id. at 1589 Fig. 1. See, also, Robert W. Adler, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s New Waters of the 
Unted States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCIENCE 1588 (2015) (explaining the manner in 
which the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule, supported by the SYNTHESIS REPORT, addressed the “significant 
nexus” test endorsed by Justice Kennedy and other aspects of the Supreme Court’s decisions). 
159 See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 155, at xiii-xviii (identifying involved scientists); Alexander, supra note 134, 
at 1590; 80 Fed. Reg. at 37057 (explaining use of the SYNTHESIS REPORT in developing the amended rule).  Because 
the purpose of the SYNTHESIS REPORT was to evaluate the existing scientific literature rather than to generate new 
science, this process per se did not help scientists develop future research agendas, as envisioned by the idea of 
translational ecology. It is clear, however, that aquatic ecologists and other scientists interested in this issue had, for 
many years, conducted research specifically to respond to earlier judicial decisions on the issue. See, e.g., Joseph F. 
Ebersole, et al., Predicting the Occurrence of Cold-Water Patches at Intermittent and Ephemeral Tributary 
Confluences with Warm Rivers, 34 FRESHWATER SCIENCE 111, 111-12 (2014) (explaining the relevance of the 
research in helping to reduce scientific uncertainty relevant to Rapanos; Mushet et al., supra note 154, at 423-24 
(noting that an earlier issue of the journal Wetlands had been catalyzed by the Supreme Court decision in SWANCC). 
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extensive scientific review and opportunities for public input, including three external peer 
reviews, a review by EPA’s Science Advisory Board, and an opportunity for public comment that 
generated more than 130,000 comments,160 in addition to the regular public notice and comment 
process accompanying the agencies’ rulemaking process.161 
Despite these efforts to engage in practices advocated by translational ecologists (whether 
intentional or not), it is evident that the synthesis report process failed almost to resolve the 
longstanding dispute over the scope of CWA jurisdiction. Interest groups dissatisfied with the 
resulting Obama Administration regulation challenged the rule immediately, in multiple courts and 
jurisdictions.162 The Trump Administration later withdrew the Obama Administration regulation 
and issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the regulations once again.163 
It may be that the perceived or actual costs and burdens of CWA compliance are too 
hefty,164 or the politics of subjecting private landowners to federal regulation of land and water use 
that are traditionally state domains165 are too divisive,166 to expect that an inclusive scientific 
process will ever suffice to resolve the issue. Indeed, clearer statutory language may ultimately be 
the only viable solution to the problem.167 It may also be, however, that simply subjecting drafts 
of the synthesis report to traditional notice and comment insufficiently involved interested 
stakeholders to have expected that it would generate political consensus on such a divisive conflict. 
A more inclusive and iterative process that embraces all of the principles of translational ecology, 
that involves the full range of interested stakeholders as well as decision makers from the outset 
in planning and conducting relevant research, and that communicates the results of that research 
clearly, at least has potential to move in the direction of resolving a controversy that is now 
approaching its half century anniversary. 
 
160 See Alexander, supra note 157, at 1590. 
161 See supra note 141 (discussing 2015 rulemaking process). 
162 See Adler, supra note 158, at 1595-96 (citing early challenges to amended WOTUS rule); Nat’l Ass’n. of Mfrs. v. 
Dept. of Defense, 138 S.Ct. 617 (2018) (holding that judicial jurisdiction over multiple regulatory challenges to rule 
was in federal district court).  
163 See supra note 141. 
164 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (Scalia, J., citing the costs and burdens of CWA compliance). 
165 See 33 U.S.C. §§1251(b), (g) (expressing Congress’ recognition of traditional state authority over land and water 
policy and management). 
166 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 136, at 279-80 (noting the extreme “political dissensus” surrounding adoption of the 
Obama Administration WOTUS rule).   
167 Arguably, the fundamental error originated in Congress’s decision to begin with the traditional term “navigable 
waters” and then to redefine that term to mean “waters of the United States” with no clear definition of the latter 
term. See supra note 137.  
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2. Implementing CWA Statutory Programs  
EPA and state water quality agencies have struggled to implement some of the CWA’s key 
regulatory programs, in part due to inadequate understanding of relevant scientific factors. 
Significant and relatively swift progress was made in reducing the discharge of pollutants into the 
nation’s waters from point sources such as major industries and public sewage treatment plants.168 
Those kinds of problems were amenable to engineering solutions to identify the best and most 
affordable methods of wastewater treatment technology,169 enforced via the CWA’s strict and 
mandatory permitting provisions for point source dischargers.170 Although the CWA’s point 
source controls have not achieved the statute’s zero discharge goal,171 and the Act calls for ongoing 
revisions to technology-based standards in pursuit of that goal,172 the engineering science needed 
to do so is relatively clear and focused: what new or improved treatment methods or industrial 
process changes are available or need to be developed to further reduce or eliminate discharges 
from particular kinds of industry?  
Despite progress in reducing point source pollution, a large percentage of the Nation’s 
waters remain chemically, physically, or biologically impaired.173 In addition to remaining point 
source discharges, this remaining pollution derives largely from the runoff of large amounts of 
additional pollutants from so-called “nonpoint sources,”174 as well as additional “pollution”175 
 
168 See ADLER, LANDMAN & CAMERON, supra note 140, at 14-18; Robert W. Adler, The Decline and (Possible) 
Renewal of Aspiration in the Clean Water Act, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 759, 776-77 (2013). 
169 EPA’s adopted “best technology” standards known as secondary treatment for municipal sewage point sources, 40 
C.F.R. Pt. 133. EPA has also adopted best technology treatment standards for various categories of industrial 
discharges. Id. Pts. 400 - 471.  
170 See 33 U.S.C. §§1311 (prohibiting any discharge of a pollutant absent a valid permit and compliance with 
applicable treatment standards); 1342 (providing for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permits for discharges of most pollutants).  
171 See id. §1251(a)(1); Adler, supra note 168.  
172 See id. §§1311(b) (requiring EPA to revise effluent limitations guidelines “at least annually”); 1316(b) (requiring 
EPA to revise technology-based standards for new sources periodically). The reality has been that most of the 
technology-based standards have not been revised for decades. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. Pts. 405 (guidelines for dairy 
products processing last revised in 1995); 406 (guidelines for grain mills last revised in 1995); 408 (guidelines for 
seafood processing last revised in 1995). 
173 See Adler, supra note 168, at 777-79.  
174 The CWA does not define the term “nonpoint source” separately, leaving its meaning to be deduced by negative 
implication. Any source of pollutant release into the Nation’s waters other than a point source is a nonpoint source. 
Examples include dispersed runoff from farms, construction sites, etc., so long as those pollutants are not collected or 
channelized into a point source before being released into a water body. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the 
Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between channelized and un-channelized 
discharges of pollutants from manure spreading).  
175 The CWA distinguishes between adverse impacts caused by the discharge of pollutants, which are redressed by the 
Act’s point source control provisions, see supra note 169 and accompanying text, and the broader impacts of those 
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from causes such as loss or impairment of wetlands and other aquatic habitat; loss of riparian 
vegetation and other habitat;  the impacts of dams, impoundments, stream channelization and other 
forms of hydromodification; the hydrologic impacts of increased construction, paving, and other 
impervious surfaces in watersheds; and the impacts of invasive species.176  
One likely cause of this failure was congressional failure to adopt stricter control programs 
for other pollution sources relative to those that apply to point sources, but legislative changes to 
correct that deficiency are politically unlikely.  Absent such changes, this is a key opportunity for 
translational ecology to help inform better implementation of some of the existing statutory 
programs designed to identify and redress those problems. At least three key CWA programs 
provide opportunities for translational ecology to contribute to progress in this area. 
a. Nonpoint source pollution control 
In both 1972 and 1987, Congress adopted separate provisions of the CWA to redress 
nonpoint source pollution through state nonpoint source management programs.177 Although the 
degree to which nonpoint sources contribute to water pollution has been known at least since the 
1972 version of the CWA,178 implementation of the state nonpoint source planning and 
management process has been slow and often less effective than needed.179 Improved nonpoint 
source management efforts require scientific assistance to identify nonpoint pollution sources,180 
develop and evaluate the efficacy of available control methods,181 and conduct ongoing monitoring 
and assessment to improve programs over time. Consistent with the concept of translational 
ecology, the statute embraces the use of external expertise182 and public and intergovernmental 
engagement and coordination to maximize the involvement and buy-in of interested 
stakeholders.183  
 
and other forms of water “pollution”, defined as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, 
biological, and radiological integrity of water.” 33 U.S.C. §1362(19). 
176 See Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 197, 212-15 (John c. Dernbach, ed. 
2002). 
177 See 33 U.S.C. §§1288, 1329; Pub. L. 100-4, §316(a), 101 Stat. 52 (Feb. 4, 1987), adding 33 U.S.C. §1329.  
178 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3705; ADLER, LANDMAN & CAMERON, supra 
note 140, at 171-73. The 1972 statute attempted to address nonpoint source pollution through comprehensive state 
water pollution control plans, see id. §1288. Congress added the more specific provision in 1987 due to the absence 
of sufficient progress under the earlier provision. See Robert W. Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture: Assessing 
Alternative Futures, 25 ENVIRONS 77, 79-80 (2002). 
179 See Adler, supra note 178. 
180 33 U.S.C. §1329(a)(1)B). 
181 Id. §1329(a)(1)(D). 
182 Id. §1329(b)(3). 
183 Id. §1329(a)(1)(C). 
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Nonpoint source pollution control efforts have been divisive because they implicate and 
potentially regulate or otherwise affect184 the actions of a wide range of landowners and land users 
whose land uses may impair water bodies. As is true of the definition of “waters of the United 
States,” federal legislation governing land and water use is politically controversial.185 Small 
farmers and other landowners are not always inclined to accept information from environmental 
scientists that may impair their livelihoods and ways of life,186 particularly given the recent 
research regarding the degree to which shows that political views influence trust in science.187 No 
single effort is likely to eliminate the longstanding political resistance to nonpoint source pollution 
control. Nevertheless, efforts by translational ecologists to involve landowners (as well as state 
and local water pollution control and land use planning officials) directly in research planning, and 
to communicate research results effectively, could help generate increased trust and therefore 
increased willingness to adopt management practices to reduce nonpoint source pollution impacts. 
b. Total maximum daily loads 
In addition to other comprehensive water pollution control planning provisions in the 
CWA,188 the CWA includes a specific provision designed to account for—and allocate control 
obligations among—all sources contributing to water quality standards (WQS) violations in a 
particular water body or water body segment.189 The Act requires states or EPA to identify all 
water bodies for which technology-based controls alone are not sufficient to attain applicable 
WQS,190 and then to calculate the total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants the water 
body can accommodate without exceeding WQS under the range of hydrologic conditions 
expected in the watershed.191 The TMDL process and other provisions of the CWA192 then require 
 
184 Unlike the point source control provisions of the CWA, section 319 does not mandate state regulation of nonpoint 
sources; nor does it authorize EPA to adopt stricter control provisions where state programs fail to address nonpoint 
source pollution problems. Rather states, are free to choose whatever regulatory or nonregulatory mechanism they 
believe are appropriate to address particular nonpoint sources. See id. §1329(b). 
185 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
186 See Hanna L. Breetz et al., Trust and Communication: Mechanisms for Increasing Farmers’ Participation in Water 
Quality Trading, 81 LAND ECONOMICS 170 (2005).  
187 See supra note 62. 
188 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§1288, 1313(d). 
189 Id. §1313(d).  
190 Id. §1313(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B). 
191 Id. §1313(d)(1)(C), (d)(1)(D). 
192 Id. §1311(b)(1)(C). 
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states to impose additional control requirements on the responsible pollution sources which, in the 
aggregate, will result in WQS attainment.193  
Although the TMDL process may appear to be a matter of simple arithmetic,194 it is fraught 
with scientific complexities. Uncertainties include temporal and geographic variability in pollutant 
loads from individual sources,195 variables affecting the transport and fate of pollutants once in the 
aquatic system,196 and variability in hydrology within seasonal, annual, or longer time periods.197 
Scientists have developed a variety of computer models designed to predict the relationship 
between pollutant discharges and WQS attainment in the face of all of those variables.198  
The TMDL process becomes even more complex and uncertain for pollution sources other 
than the release of discrete pollutants, as is the process of allocating control obligations among the 
sources of that pollution, which involves both scientific and non-scientific factors. For example, if 
the temperature of a water body exceeds the applicable WQS due to thermal discharges from 
water-cooled electric power plants or other sources that release pollutants with elevated 
temperatures, a TMDL can allocate control responsibilities by defining necessary temperature 
limits on those discharges.199 If stream temperatures increase due to the loss of riparian vegetative 
cover, however, scientists must study the relationship between vegetative shade and water 
 
193 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4; 130.7; Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. EPA, 504 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied by 
Carlotta Copper Co. v. Friends of Pinto Creek, 55 U.S. 1097 (2009); Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 
2002); see, generally, OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 2002)..  
194 At the simplest level, a TMDL is the sum of all of the point source contributions to a water body segment of a 
particular pollutant, plus the sum of all nonpoint source inputs of the same pollutant, plus all of the natural background 
load or inputs of that pollutant, plus any allocation reserved for additional pollutants from future growth, plus any 
margin of safety determined necessary to account for scientific uncertainty or to be conservative about WQS 
attainment. EPA expresses this as a simple equation. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Overview of Total Maximum Daily 
Loads (TMDLs), https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/overview-total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdls. 
195 Industrial discharges may vary with production levels, inputs used, and other factors; municipal discharges may 
vary with population; and nonpoint source inputs vary with precipitation magnitude and intensity. 
196 For example, some pollutants change or interact chemically or biologically over time, others volatilize into the air, 
and others may precipitate into the sediment, or be re-released into the water body from sediment. See, generally, 
CHIN, supra note 128, ch.3.  
197 Larger flows increase the loads of pollutants a water body can receive before violating WQS, known as 
“assimilative capacity.” See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guidelines for Reviewing TMDLs under Existing Regulations 
Issued in 1992, available at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
10/documents/2002_06_04_tmdl_guidance_final52002.pdf. Hydrology naturally varies over wet and dry seasons, 
within those seasons. Regions also experience periods of drought or relatively high precipitation, factors likely to 
become more variably still given climate change. See, e.g., P.C.D. Milly et al., Global Patterns of Trends in 
Streamflow and Water Availability in a Changing Climate, 438 NATURE 347 (2005).  
198 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 841B-97-006, COMPENDIUM OF TOOLS FOR WATERSHED ASSESSMENT AND 
TMDL DEVELOPMENT (1997), available at: 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/20004NX4.PDF?Dockey=20004NX4.PDF.  
199 See 33 U.S.C. §§1313(d)(1)(B), (d)(1)(D); 40 C.F.R. §130.7(c)(2). 
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temperatures, and perhaps determine how much replanting is necessary to restore stream 
temperatures to acceptable levels. Likewise, if natural assemblages of fish and other aquatic 
organisms are altered or depleted due to factors other than chemical pollutants, such as lost or 
impaired riparian wetland or floodplain habitat,200 scientists must work with agency officials and 
other stakeholders to ascertain what sources or combinations of sources of impairment contribute 
to the problem, and what remedial measures might suffice to restore aquatic ecosystem health. 
Working on those issues for particular water bodies with identified WQS violations, in 
collaboration with landowners and agency officials, provide excellent opportunities for 
translational ecology.  
The TMDL process, moreover, is a zero-sum game, further suggesting the applicability of 
translational ecology. The manner in which the TMDL allocates control obligations among 
pollution sources is partly a matter of science and partly a matter of value judgments.201 This 
control allocation challenge is exacerbated when identified WQS impairments derive from large 
numbers of dispersed nonpoint sources. That raises the same issues of trust as suggested for the 
nonpoint source management program,202 and suggests the potential utility of efforts by scientists 
to collaborate with landowners and agency officials as they develop and communicate research 
designed to identify appropriate remedial actions in the TMDL program. 
3. Implementing Water Body Restoration and Protection Programs 
A third area of opportunity for the application of translational ecology to the CWA is in 
helping to inform and assess implementation of the many water body-specific restoration and 
protection programs in the statute. Those include the Chesapeake Bay Program,203 the Great Lakes 
Program,204 the Long Island Sound Program,205 the Lake Champlain Program,206 and the National 
 
200 See supra note 176. 
201 Nothing in the CWA or in EPA’s regulations dictate how states must allocate pollutant loads or other pollution 
sources among those who contribute to the problem, so long as all pollutant sources are included and the TMDL 
provides for attainment of the WQS. See 40 C.F.R. §130.7(c)(1) (stating only that states must develop TMDLs “at 
levels necessary to attain and maintain the applicable narrative and numeric WQS with seasonal variations and a 
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent 
limitations and water quality”). 
202 See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text. 
203 33 U.S.C. §1267. 
204 Id. §1268. 
205 Id. §1269. 
206 Id. §1270. 
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Estuary Program,207 as well as the panoply of other watershed restoration and protection programs 
that have developed at various levels of size, organization, and management.208  
In some respects, using translational ecology in the context of individual water body 
restoration and protection programs seems less significant than helping to define the scope and 
objectives of the entire statute. In other respects, however, translational ecology is perfectly suited 
to individual water body programs. Unlike the Clean Air Act, which authorizes and requires EPA 
to establish a single national set of ambient air quality standards for the nation,209 Congress 
recognized in the CWA that different aquatic ecosystems may require different water quality 
standards and different restoration and protection goals, charging states to adopt water quality 
standards (WQS) for different water bodies210 based on national guidance documents issued by 
EPA.211 Thus, scientific research agendas specific to individual water bodies and watersheds are 
critical to identifying specific restoration and protection goals, identifying the sources of individual 
watershed impairment and reasons for aquatic ecosystem degradation, and planning and 
monitoring the effectiveness of remediation efforts.  
In this regard, watershed restoration and protection programs are conceptually consistent 
with translational ecology. Watershed programs typically involve all relevant stakeholders (water 
body users, other local residents, land users and others who may impair watershed uses and values, 
responsible agency officials and political leaders, and scientists and other experts) in efforts to set 
program goals, design and implement remediation actions, monitor program implementation and 
effectiveness, and reiterate the process in a continuous effort to improve results. It is but a short 
paddle stroke for practitioners of translational ecology to engage with existing or new watershed 
 
207 Id. §1330. 
208 Other large watershed programs have developed to address a range of aquatic ecosystem health problems, such as 
the program to restore the Sacramento-San Joaquim River Delta that feeds into San Francisco Bay, now under the 
auspices of the Delta Stewardship Council, see https://deltacouncil.ca.gov/; and the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive 
Management Program administered pursuant to the Grand Canyon Protection Act, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669 et 
seq., Oct. 30, 1992, by the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, see 
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/phoenix/AZ100/1990/grand_canyon_protection_act_1992.html. Other watershed and water 
body-specific programs, however, have developed to restore and protect everything from local streams to larger 
watersheds. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Healthy Watersheds Protection, https://www.epa.gov/hwp/healthy-
watersheds-projects-your-state-and-region (providing database of watershed protection efforts by state). 
209 42 U.S.C. §7409. Uniform nationwide air quality standards make sense because human susceptibility to the adverse 
health effects of air pollution does not vary significantly with location. But see James E. Krier, The Irrational National 
Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974-1975) (arguing that uniform 
national standards do not promote rational resource allocation). 
210 33 U.S.C. §1313(c); see 40 C.F.R. §§131.6, 131.10, 131.11. 
211 33 U.S.C. §1314(a); see 40 C.F.R. §131.11(b).  
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protection programs as a way to achieve all of the goals of the practice: working with the end users 
of their science to identify relevant and action-oriented research agendas, communicating the 
results of their research in ways that directly aid in program implementation and reiterating the 
process as needed, and building a relationship of trust between scientists and stakeholders.  
Moreover, in the CWA’s various water body protection programs Congress provided for 
many of the same attributes as advocated by the proponents of translational ecology. Watershed 
programs focus on holistic ecosystem restoration and protection goals.212 They are necessarily 
interdisciplinary.213 They rely on extensive stakeholder participation and collaboration.214 Most 
importantly, they specifically provide for extensive involvement by scientists in achieving 
program goals through a coordinated process that requires ongoing and effective communication 
and collaboration.215 Specific statutory authority is not necessary to establish similar efforts in 
other watersheds, as evidenced by the history of effective collaborative watershed programs 
around the country.216 All effective watershed programs provide a mechanism for effective 
communication and collaboration between involved scientists and other stakeholders.217 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act  
Like the CWA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) begins with broad 
statements of ecological objectives, suggesting opportunities for the application of translational 
ecology. The opening provision of NEPA establishes as the law’s purposes:  
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony 
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; 
 
212 See 33 U.S.C. §§1267(a)(3), (g) (ecosystem restoration scope of Chesapeake Bay Programs); 1268(a)(3)(C), (I), 
(4) (calling for ecosystem-based, lake wide management plans for the Great Lakes); 1269(c)(1) (calling for 
comprehensive conservation and management plan for Long Island Sound); 1270(e) (requiring comprehensive 
pollution prevention, control, and restoration plan for Lake Champlain).  
213 See id. §§1267(g)(1) (Chesapeake Bay); 1269(c)(2) (Long Island Sound).  
214 See id. §§1267(b)(2(B)(v) (Chesapeake Bay); 1269(c)(8), (d)(3) (Long Island Sound); 1270(b) (Lake Champlain). 
215 See id. §§1267(b)(2), (d), (e), (h)(i) (Chesapeake Bay); 1268(d) (Great Lakes); 1270(c), (d) (Lake Champlain). 
216 See supra note 209.  
217 See, e.g., http://www.chesapeake.org/stac/ (describing role of the Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee in 
the Chesapeake Bay Program); https://www.glri.us/node/39 
(describing the Science and Information Subcommittee of the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative);  
https://deltacouncil.ca.gov/delta-science-program/ (describing the Delta Science Program component of the Delta 
Stewardship Council); https://www.usgs.gov/centers/sbsc/gcmrc (describing efforts of the U.S. Geological Survey’s 
Grand Canyon Research and Monitoring Center to help monitor and implement the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive 
Management Program).  
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[and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation….218 
 Congress also declared a national environmental policy to “create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony” for the benefit of current and future 
generations, through cooperation with state and local governments as well as other public and 
private organizations,219 along with a series of somewhat more specific environmental goals.220  
 Research on how to define and achieve these lofty goals alone provides an ambitious 
scientific research agenda for environmental scientists. Moreover, NEPA as initially drafted 
provided significant statutory support for the kinds of collaborative science envisioned by 
translational ecology, although some of the relevant provisions have since been terminated or are 
no longer being implemented fully. For example, although Congress assigned principle 
responsibility for implementing the statute’s policies and purposes to agencies of the federal 
government, NEPA also recognizes the value of partnerships with other levels of government and 
“other concerned public and private organizations,”221 a collaborative focus mirrored by 
translational ecology. NEPA initially included a provision mandating the scientific study and 
reporting of long-term environmental conditions and trends;222 and a provision for consultation 
with a presidentially-created Citizens’ Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality comprised 
of the kinds of end users and stakeholders identified by translational ecologists.223 
Taken alone, however, the kind of environmental science suggested by these provisions 
would not necessarily be “actionable” in the sense intended by Schlesinger and his successors in 
defining the goals of translational ecology. The greater opportunity for translational ecology is in 
 
218 42 U.S.C. §4321. The final purpose articulated in this provision, not relevant here, was to “establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality.” Id.  
219 Id. §4331(a). 
220 These include responsibilities to future generations; “safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically pleasing 
surroundings” for all Americans; provision of beneficial environmental uses without undue environmental 
degradation, human health or safety risks, or other unintended consequences; preservation of important elements of 
our historic, cultural, and natural heritage; a sustainable balance between population and resource use; and 
enhancement of the quality of renewable resources through recycling and other measures. Id. §4331(b)(1)-(6). 
221 Id. §4331(a). 
222 Id. §4344. As part of a more comprehensive effort to reduce federal agency reporting obligations, Congress 
terminated this requirement effective May 15, 2000. Pub. L. No. 104-66, §3003, 109 Stat. 734-35 (Dec. 21, 1995). 
See, also, 42 U.S.C. §4363 (requiring EPA to conduct long-term environmental research and development). 
223 42 U.S.C. §4345 (requiring consultation with existing committee including representatives of science, industry, 
agriculture, labor, conservation organizations, state and local governments, and others). This Committee was 
terminated in 1977. See Exec. Order No, 12,007, Aug. 12, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 42839. See, also, 42 U.S.C. §4365 
(requiring EPA to establish and maintain a Science Advisory Board). 
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its potential to further NEPA’s pivotal operative provision, which requires all federal agencies to 
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for every “recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment….”224 Those statements must identify and evaluate the environmental impacts 
of the proposed action, any unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the action, alternatives 
to the proposed action, the relationship between short-term environmental uses and long-term 
environmental productivity, and any “irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources” that 
will result from the proposed action.225 
 As explained by the courts, although NEPA’s EIS requirement does not mandate any 
particular substantive decisions or results, it does require federal agencies to evaluate carefully the 
environmental impacts of their proposals and to integrate that information into agency decisions.226 
This ensures that federal agencies consider environmental information and values so they are not 
ignored in the fulfillment of the many other agency missions defined by Congress (such as building 
and maintaining roads and other infrastructure, operating federal aid programs, managing public 
lands and waters, etc.).227 
 Thus, the EIS requirement is fundamentally an exercise in predictive environmental 
science, and environmental scientists are necessarily deeply involved in the NEPA process.228 It 
involves both adequate historical research and analysis to define the baseline environmental 
conditions against which changes should be measured,229 and predictive modeling and analysis.230 
This effort is immensely challenging given the wide range of federal agency actions subject to the 
EIS mandate, the even broader array of potential environmental impacts those actions might 
 
224 Id. §4331(2)(C). 
225 Id. §4331(2)(C)(i)-(v). The President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has issued regulations governing 
the substance and procedure of agency NEPA compliance. See 40 C.F.R. Pts.1500-1508. Each federal agency is 
required to promulgate its own procedures, as necessary, to ensure compliance with NEPA and the CEQ regulations. 
See id. §§1505.1; 1507.3. 
226 See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008); Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
227 See Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88, reh’g denied, 429 
U.S. 875 (1976). 
228 See Mathew Cashmore, The Role of Science in Environmental Impact Assessment: Process and Procedure Versus 
Purpose in the Development of Theory, 24 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 403 (2004). 
229 See 40 C.F.R. §1502.15. 
230 See Bradley Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 344 (2004) (noting that NEPA analysis is 
largely predictive). 
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cause,231 and the inherent uncertainty of predicting future impacts from actions not yet taken. After 
all, it is usually difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.232  
 This level of difficulty in implementing NEPA’s predictive inquiry has generated a certain 
amount of cynicism on all sides of the environmental spectrum. 233 Environmental advocates and 
some academics bemoan the fact that NEPA’s process does not presumptively or prescriptively 
mandate better environmental results.234 Critics on the pro-development side of the spectrum argue 
that NEPA serves no purpose other than to delay valuable projects and other agency actions and 
decisions, with little or no discernible environmental benefits,235 prompting frequent calls for 
NEPA reform.236 Agency officials may feel inundated by the challenges and burdens of NEPA or 
feel that it distracts them from their primary agency missions.237  
Because of its collaborative, trust-building focus, translational ecology might have 
potential to overcome at least some of this cynicism and criticism. The CEQ regulations focus 
repeatedly on the need for adequate, high quality science to support the NEPA process.238 Other 
aspects of the CEQ regulations mirror the philosophy and attributes of translational ecology. For 
example, they urge agencies to focus on information and analysis that is useful and actionable, 
rather than excessive focus on details with little significance to agency decisions.239 The rules 
counsel agencies to prepare impact statements that communicate the relevant environmental and 
other scientific information clearly and concisely, in language understandable to end users.240 CEQ 
encourages a systematic and interdisciplinary approach241 requiring frequent consultation and 
 
231 NEPA requires analysis of both the direct and indirect environmental impacts of proposed federal agency actions, 
including impacts caused by induced growth. See 40 C.F.R. §§1502.16(a), (b); 1508.8. 
232 This quip is often attributed to N.Y. Yankee great and major league manager Yogi Berra. See Wikiquote, Yogi 
Berra, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Yogi_Berra. However, it can be traced back at least to Danish physicist Niels 
Bohr and is derived from an old Danish proverb. See Quote Investigator, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-
predict/.   
233 See Karkkainen, supra note 230, at 338-43.  
234 See id. at 342-43. 
235 See id. at 340-41.  
236 For a description of the most recent such effort at the administrative level, see Valeri Volcovici, Trump 
Administration Readies Plan to Speed Environmental Permitting, Reuters, May 22, 2019, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-environment-regulation/trump-administration-readies-draft-plan-to-speed-
environmental-permitting-idUSKCN1SS2WP.  
237 See Karkkainen, supra note 230, at 341-42. 
238 See 40 C.F.R. §§1500.1(b) (calling for “high quality information” and “accurate” scientific information); 1502.24 
(requiring agencies to ensure the scientific integrity of information in impact statements); 1506.5(a) (requiring 
agencies to independently verify information provided by applicants or other sources). 
239 See id. §§1500.1(b); 1500.2(b); 1500.4(b); 1501.1(d); 1501.7(a)(3); 1502.2(a), (b).  
240 See id. §§1500.2(b); 1500.4 (d); 1502.2(a); 1502.8. 
241 See id. §§1501.2(a); 1502.6;  
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collaboration,242 as well as outreach to and participation by all affected groups and individuals.243 
The NEPA scoping process is designed to identify which impacts and issues are most important 
for study and analysis,244 similar to translational ecology’s call for consultation on the most useful 
and relevant scientific research agendas. 
Recently, CEQ has actively promoted the concept of “collaborative NEPA,” recognizing 
that despite NEPA’s collaborative intent “the full potential for more actively identifying and 
engaging other Federal, Tribal, State and local agencies, affected and interested parties, and the 
public at large in collaborative environmental analysis and federal decision-making is rarely 
realized.”245 Other agencies and entities have followed suit,246 although it is not clear how often 
agencies have followed the collaborative approach proposed in the CEQ handbook. Although the 
CEQ collaboration handbook is aimed at federal agencies implementing the statute, it provides a 
clear opportunity for scientists to engage more fully in the EIS process. 
Despite these trends, however, several aspects of NEPA have been particularly challenging 
in ways that suggest more specific opportunities for using translational ecology to improve 
statutory implementation and effectiveness, and to enhance the role of environmental scientists in 
the NEPA process. Those opportunities are identified and discussed below. 
1. The timing of environmental impact analysis  
One key issue that has plagued the environmental impact process has been the proper 
timing of an EIS. The threshold inquiry of whether an EIS is required for a particular agency 
action247 is a mixed question of science and judgment in determining which impacts are likely and 
whether they might “significantly” affect the human environment.248 A related question, however, 
 
242 See id. §§1501.1(b); 1501.2(d)(2); 1501.6; 1501.7(a)(1); 1502.19(a). 
243 See id. §§1502.19; 1503.1; 1503.4; 1503.3(d); 1506.6. 
244 See id. §§1500.4(b); 1501.1(d); 1501.7. 
245 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, COLLABORATION IN NEPA, A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 1 
(2007), available at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/CEQ_Collaboration_in_NEPA_10-2007.pdf. 
246 See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREST FOUNDATION, ROADMAP FOR COLLABORATION BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE 
NEPA PROCESS (2013), available at: https://www.nationalforests.org/assets/files/Roadmap-for-Collaboration-Before-
During-and-After-the-NEPA-Process_NFF.pdf (developed in partnership with the U.S. Forest Service); see, also, P. 
Lynn Scarlett, The National Environmental Policy Act: Enhancing Collaboration and Partnerships, Resources (July 
2012), available at: https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/the-national-environmental-policy-act-
enhancing-collaboration-and-partnerships/. 
247 An EIS is required when a federal agency makes a proposal for action that may significantly affect the human 
environment. See Dept. of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763-64 (2004). Agencies sometimes conduct a 
preliminary analysis known as an “environmental assessment” (EA) to determine whether that threshold has been met. 
See 40 C.F.R. §§1501.4, 1508.9. 
248 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (indicating that agencies are 
entitled to significant deference in determining whether impacts are significant enough to require an EIS); 40 C.F.R. 
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is when the agency decision is ripe for environmental analysis. If environmental review occurs too 
late in an agency’s decision process, the proposal may already have hardened sufficiently that there 
is little or no room for the EIS process to alter the agency’s thinking.249 Therefore, the CEQ 
regulations urge agencies to “insure that environmental information is available to public officials 
before decisions are made and before actions are taken.”250 On the other hand, if agencies are 
required to initiate the NEPA process too early, the agency may not have developed a proposal 
that is likely to be considered seriously, or that has developed sufficiently to allow analysis that is 
not too speculative to be helpful.251 
This balance in determining the appropriate timing for environmental review—not to soon 
but not too late—makes sense from the perspective of agency decision making and efficiency. It 
avoids wasted time and effort on preliminary ideas that do not ultimately move forward, 
particularly given typically constrained agency resources. Conversely, it seeks to ensure that 
environmental information is available early enough in the decision process to have a meaningful 
impact on the agency decision. From a scientific perspective, however, this balance can be 
problematic. Good science often takes time, particularly when studying environmental conditions 
that vary over time and space, requiring longitudinal monitoring and analysis even to establish a 
reasonable baseline with which to compare potential future impacts. 
Thus, if an agency waits until a proposal is sufficiently well-formed to warrant an EIS, 
preventing potentially wasted agency time and resources, it may be too late to generate sufficient 
baseline or predictive scientific information to support a meaningful analysis. If sufficient baseline 
and other relevant environmental information is not available by the time a NEPA process begins, 
the agency has limited options. It can rely on the CEQ regulatory provision regarding “incomplete 
or unavailable information” discussed in the following subsection,252 or it can attempt to generate 
new information quickly enough to support the necessary environmental analysis. The latter course 
 
§§1508.27 (defining “significantly” in terms of human contexts as well as scientific analysis); 1508.14 (defining the 
“human environment”). 
249 See Amer. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. F.C.C., 516 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
250 40 C.F.R. §1500.1(b). See, also, id. §§1500.5(a), (f); 1501.1(a), (d); 1501.2; 1502.5. Related provisions of the CEQ 
regulations cautions agencies not to “commit resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before making a final 
decision,” id. §1502.2(f), or to allow actions in advance of the record of decision on the proposal that would have 
adverse environmental impacts or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. Id. §1506.1(a). See, also, id. §1506.10 
(prohibiting agency decisions until EIS process and opportunity for public comment is completed). 
251 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1976) (requiring an agency “proposal” that is sufficiently ripe 
to trigger an EIS).  
252 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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may generate longer delays in project approval and permitting or in other agency decisions, 
potentially generating additional backlash against NEPA. Such constraints might also undermine 
trust and confidence in the integrity of the NEPA process. 
Proper consultation between academic and other independent scientists practicing 
translational ecology and agency officials, project proponents, and concerned environmental 
groups might help to bridge this temporal gap. Although the timing and location of development 
projects that may be subject to NEPA scrutiny cannot always be predicted with certainty, agencies 
often have a good idea of the kinds of projects that may be subject to review in the future, and the 
kinds of environmental research that would be useful to support better NEPA analysis of those 
proposals. For example, even absent precise delineation of wetlands acreage in advance of specific 
applications to fill wetlands,253 a district office of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) is 
likely to know which areas in the region have significant areas of wetlands, which are subject to 
future development under local planning and zoning, and what kinds of baseline scientific research 
would be useful to help predict the impacts of development on wetland values and functions.254 In 
some cases, projects may even be anticipated in long-term agency planning documents, such as 
management plans for National Forests255 or lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) subject to grazing, mining, or oil and gas development.256 
One application of translational ecology to the NEPA process, then, might be efforts by 
academic and other independent scientists to engage in dialogues with agency scientists and other 
officials, environmental groups, and individuals or entities who may be planning development 
projects that may be subject to NEPA review. Such dialogues might anticipate the kinds of baseline 
scientific research that would be most helpful in future NEPA reviews, and therefore help scientists 
to develop research agendas that are relevant and useful. Indeed, although not specific to the NEPA 
process alone, researchers at the University of Arizona recently convened a meeting between 
scientists working in the Colorado River ecosystem, federal and state agency officials, 
 
253 See 33 U.S.C. §1344 (requiring permits from ACE or a delegated state agency to discharge dredge or fill material 
into waters of the United States, including wetlands subject to the CWA). 
254 Applicable regulations governing required compensatory mitigation requires that mitigation projects replace the 
lost or impaired wetland values and functions due to a project. See 40 C.F.R. §230.93. Because this is not simply a 
matter of counting the acreage of wetlands lost and replaced or restored, more sophisticated scientific analysis is 
needed to support both the section 404 permit review and any associated EIS. 
255 See 36 U.S.C. §1604 (governing National Forest System planning process). 
256 See 43 U.S.C. §1712 (governing planning process for public lands managed by BLM).  
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environmental groups, tribes, and other stakeholders to help advise scientists on what additional 
research would be most useful to future Colorado River restoration and management efforts.257 
2. Uncertainty analysis and “incomplete or unavailable information” 
Closely related to the issue of the timing of EIS preparation and the scientific information 
needed to support it is the CEQ regulation governing “incomplete or unavailable information.”258 
Agencies must fill existing gaps in scientific or other information where “the information relevant 
to reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and 
the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant.”259 Where it is impossible for an agency to 
obtain such information, or where the costs of doing so is exorbitant, the agency must include in 
the EIS a statement identifying the incomplete or unavailable information and its relevance to the 
analysis, summarize “existing credible evidence” relevant to predicting the environmental impacts 
at issue, and predict those impacts as well as possible using “theoretical approaches or research 
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.”260 
As noted above, the preferred approach to the problem of incomplete or unavailable 
information is to find ways to anticipate NEPA’s informational needs to the maximum extent 
possible, using translational ecology processes or otherwise.261 The number actions potentially 
subject to NEPA, the diverse range of potential NEPA analysis, and the scope of potential 
environmental impacts so broad, however, 262 that it would be impossible even to anticipate all of 
the necessary information and scientific background research comprehensively. Thus, predictive 
methodology will always be a fundamental aspect of the NEPA process.  
Translational ecology can play a key role as well, however, in helping to improve this 
aspect of NEPA implementation. Working with agency officials and other stakeholders, based on 
 
257 See Katharine Jacobs, Colorado River: Building a Science Agenda, Final Workshop Report (Oct. 10-12, 2017) (on 
file with author); Colorado River: Building a Science Agenda, Decision-Makers and Interested Parties Workshop, 
Final Report (Apr. 3-4, 2018) (on file with author). For purposes of full disclosure, the author participated in second 
of the two meetings in this process. 
258 40 C.F.R. §1502.22. 
259 Id. §1502.22(a). This regulation replaced a previous regulation requiring agencies to conduct a “worst case 
analysis” of potential environmental impacts in the face of uncertainty. The new regulation was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the face of a claim that a worst-case analysis was mandated by the statute. Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, supra, 490 U.S. at 354-56.  
260 40 C.F.R. §1502.22(a). 
261 See supra Part III.B.1. 
262 See John Ruple & Kayla Race, Measuring the NEPA Litigation Burden: A Review of 1,499 Court Cases, 50 
ENVTL. L. __ (forthcoming 2020); 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433437&dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_natural:resources:law:pol
icy:ejournal_abstractlink.  
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the past need for theoretical predictive methods in impact statements and anticipated future needs, 
scientists can develop research agendas to improve the accuracy and reliability of those methods. 
They can also conduct research to evaluate how well previous uses of predictive methodology 
have worked, for example, by monitoring actual environmental impacts of past NEPA decisions 
to determine how close to the mark the agency came in predicting project impacts, and then to 
propose changes to those methods or replacement methods that might perform better in the future. 
Whereas the kinds of collaborative process suggested in the previous section might be regionally 
focused, translational ecology programs designed to help identify research needs in the area of 
predictive environmental impact methods can be national in scope or focused broadly on particular 
areas of analysis. Moreover, the nature of this kind of research is not as inherently constrained by 
timing as is true for research relevant to specific proposals with pending NEPA reviews. It can 
assess the effectiveness of past predictions over time and contribute to improvements in future 
predictive methods.  
3. EIS scope and cumulative impacts analysis  
  A third persistent issue in NEPA implementation has been the difficulty of evaluating the 
cumulative environmental impacts of a pending proposal and other projects or human disturbances 
in the affected area, including other projects subject to NEPA review in the past or anticipated in 
the future. Closely related legal issues are when related projects or project segments should be 
considered in a single EIS,263 and when impact statements may be “tiered” from a broader 
programmatic or regional EIS to narrower or project-specific impact statements.264 Cumulative 
impacts analysis is fundamentally driven by ecology and other environmental sciences, and 
translational ecology again could play a role in improving this aspect of NEPA implementation.  
 Clearly, NEPA analysis would be less meaningful if agencies considered only the impacts 
of each individual proposal in isolation. Although some proposals (such as large projects or major 
agency programs) may have very significant environmental impacts taken alone, in some cases 
environmental degradation comes in the form of death by a thousand cuts—such as hundreds of 
smaller construction projects that, in the aggregate, impair watersheds by filling too many acres of 
wetlands or degrade air quality by inducing more traffic. To address this issue, the CEQ regulations 
 
263 See 40 C.F.R. §1508.25 (defining proper scope of an EIS). 
264 See id. §1502.20 (discussing option of tiering EISs to eliminate duplication). 
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require agencies to address cumulative impacts as well as direct and indirect effects,265 defining 
cumulative impact as: 
… the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action 
when added to past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what 
agencies (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative 
impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place 
over a period of time.266 
 Thus, one procedure to address cumulative impacts is for agencies to consider the 
environmental effects of the pending proposal along with the effects of other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions, even though decisions on those other actions are not part of 
the EIS. A second method is to broaden the scope of an EIS to consider multiple pending actions 
together, even if individual actions are subject to different decision processes (such as different 
permits or other approvals but addressed in a single EIS).267 A third method is to address 
cumulative environmental issues first in a broader regional or programmatic EIS, and then to “tier” 
individual proposal EISs to the broader document to avoid unnecessary duplication while still 
considering aggregate impacts.268 
 Whichever process is used, the scientific challenges inherent in cumulative impacts 
analysis are even greater than is true for individual project analysis.269 Cumulative impact analysis 
requires understanding of cause-and-effect relationships over broader temporal and geographic 
scales. It also requires an understanding of ecosystem structure and function at larger scales, and 
the nature of aggregate and synergistic effects. Those effects are likely to be confounded by an 
 
265 40 C.F.R. §1508.8 (defining “effects”). 
266 Id §1508.7. 
267 See id. §1508.25 (defining EIS scope and suggesting that agencies consider in a single EIS actions that are 
sufficiently “connected”, “cumulative”, or “similar”).  Actions are “connected” if they are “closely related” because 
they automatically trigger other actions with environmental impacts, are mutually dependent in order to occur, or 
depend on a larger action for their justification. Id. §1508.25(a)(1). Actions are “cumulative” when they have 
cumulatively significant impacts. Id. §1508.25(a)(2). Actions are “similar” if they have similarities that “provide a 
basis for evaluating their environmental consequences together, such as common timing or geography.” Id. 
§1508.25(a)(3). See, also, id. §1502.4(a) (requiring proposals “which are related to each other closely enough to be, 
in effect, a single course of action” to be evaluated together). 
268 See id. §§1502.4(b) (suggesting that agencies prepare broadly focused EISs when multiple actions are connected 
geographically, generically (common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or subject 
matter), or by stage of technological development); 1502.20, 1508.28 (encouraging agencies to tier EISs at multiple 
levels).  
269 See, e.g., L.W. Canter, Cumulative Effects and Other Analytical Challenges of NEPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND NEPA, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 115 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter, eds. 1997) (exploring the 
challenges of cumulative impacts analysis). 
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even larger range of variables than individual project impacts, making them more difficult and 
complex to study, and making conclusions potentially even less certain.  
 The kinds of collaborative and interactive process envisioned by translational ecology 
could be useful in improving the state of the art in cumulative impact assessment. At local or 
regional levels, agency officials and interested scientists could convene meetings to discuss long-
term monitoring and other research that might help agencies consider cumulative impacts more 
effectively. Because academic and other independent scientists are not constrained to study only 
those issues directly related to current projects or agency priorities, they may be in a better position 
to provide baseline analysis or cumulative impacts analysis of activities approved previously. 
Agencies and other stakeholders (including planners of future projects and environmental groups) 
could help identify the nature, scope, and potential impacts of future projects for which background 
research might be helpful. At the national level, similar collaboration between agency NEPA 
officials and environmental scientists might be useful to help guide and improve the methodologies 
used to evaluate cumulative impacts.  
C. The Endangered Species Act  
  The Endangered Species Act (ESA),270 as would be expected given the focus of the statute, 
also has a predominantly ecological focus, suggesting additional opportunities for translational 
ecology to contribute to the development and implementation of environmental law. The purpose 
of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserve [and] to provide a program for the conservation of 
such endangered species and threatened species ….”271 Thus, while a common impression of the 
ESA might suggest a narrow focus on protection of individual species, the statute actually 
promotes a broader, ecosystem-based approach to species conservation.272 
 Moreover, several aspects of the ESA mirror the basic tenets of translational ecology.  It 
calls for a multidisciplinary scientific approach to species recovery and protection,273 and expressly 
 
270 16 U.S.C. §1531 et seq. 
271 Id. §1531(b). 
272 See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 640 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (D. Hawaii), aff’d, 852 F.2d 
1106 (9th Cir. 1986). See, also, 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1)(A) (requiring species listing decisions to consider “destruction, 
modification, or curtailment of [species] habitat or range” as well as direct indicators of species depletion). 
273 See 16 U.S.C. §1532(3) (defining “conserve”, “conserving”, and “conservation” as including “all activities 
associated with scientific resources management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and 
maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation ….”).  
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invokes principles of “best science” in implementing the statute.274 It embraces collaboration 
within the federal government,275 between federal agencies and state and local agencies,276 and 
between officials charged with implementing the Act and the scientific community.277 The Act 
also includes a specific exception against otherwise prohibited activities if they are conducted for 
“scientific purposes,”278 thus facilitating additional scientific research on threatened or endangered 
species or the ecosystems on which they rely.  
 Aside from this compatibility of the ESA with scientific research in general, a number of 
specific ESA programs or functions suggest specific ways in which translational ecology might 
support or help to improve statutory implementation:  
1. Listing species and designating critical habitat 
The threshold step in the ESA regulatory scheme is to determine which species are 
threatened or endangered due to various factors.279 The responsible Cabinet Secretary280 can list 
species on their own initiative, or in response to petitions filed by interested persons (including 
academic or other independent research scientists) to list or delist a species.281 Concurrently with 
listing a species as threatened or endangered, the Secretary is required, “to the maximum extent 
prudent and determinable,” to designate any critical habitat of the species, and to revise that 
designation periodically.282 
 A key problem with ESA implementation has been the extensive backlog of species listing 
petitions, and the ability of the agencies to evaluate the validity, credibility, and sufficiency of 
 
274 See id. §§1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring species listing decisions based on “the best scientific and commercial data 
available”); 1533(b)(2) (requiring critical habitat designations based on “the best scientific data available” as well as 
economic impact, national security, and other relevant impacts of the decision); 1536(a)(2) (requiring all federal 
agencies to base species jeopardy findings on “the best scientific and commercial data available”). 
275 See id. §1536(a) (requiring federal agency consultation for actions that may jeopardize species or habitat). 
276 See id. §§1531(c)(2) (encouraging federal cooperation with state and local agencies); 1535 (requiring federal-state 
cooperation “to the maximum extent practicable” through management agreements, cooperative agreements, and 
otherwise). 
277 See id. §§1533(b)(5)(D) (requiring notice of regulations to professional scientific organizations as the Secretary 
deems appropriate), 1533(f)(2) (authorizing Secretary to enlist the services of “appropriate public and private agencies 
and institutions, and other qualified persons”). 
278 Id. §1539(a)(1)(A). 
279 Relevant factors include habitat destruction or impairment, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequate 
regulation, or other natural or human factors. See id. §1533(a)(1). 
280 For most purposes, the ESA is administered by the Secretary of the Interior for terrestrial and freshwater species, 
and the Secretary of Commerce for marine and anadromous species. See id. §1532(15). 
281 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(a). 
282 See id. §1533(a)(3)(A). 
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information suggesting that a species should be listed or delisted.283 Although the statute prescribes 
deadlines for Secretarial action in response to listing, delisting, or critical habitat petitions,284 
significant delays in the process285 have led to litigation to try to expedite agency decisions.286  
 The scientific and other factors involved in determining whether a species is sufficiently 
threatened or endangered to warrant listing,287 and to determine what areas should be designated 
as critical habitat,288 are undoubtedly complex. For example, what information suffices to 
determine that a species is threatened or endangered,289 and what recovery levels suffice to justify 
delisting?290 What attributes indicate that particular habitat areas are “critical” to species recovery 
and conservation?291 How should species categorized for purposes of determining whether distinct 
subpopulations should be considered separately for listing purposes?292 These issues require 
significant data collection and analysis to allow fully informed agency decisions, and agency 
scientists lack sufficient time and resources to fill those gaps.293 Academic and other independent 
scientists can conduct additional research to support the ESA listing and critical habitat designation 
processes. Rather than engaging in “curiosity-driven” science focused on those species or 
ecological systems an ecologist or other environmental scientists finds intellectually “interesting”, 
translational ecologists can pursue research agendas designed to fill the key existing information 
gaps that impede species listing and critical habitat designation.  
 
283 See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Act Petitions Received by Fish and Wildlife Service, 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/petitions-received.html (documenting 157 currently active petitions).  
284 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§1533(b)(3)(A) (requiring Secretary to determine whether petition presents “substantial 
scientific or commercial information” indicating that petition may be warranted); 1533(b)(3)(B) (requiring Secretary 
to issue findings within 12 months of receipt of such a petition).  
285 See Emily E. Puckett, Dylan C. Kesler, & D. Noah Greenwald, Taxa, Petitioning Agency, and Lawsuits Affect Time 
Spent Awaiting Listing Under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 201 BIOL. CONSERVATION 220 (2016) finding median 
of 12.1 years between initial consideration and listing).  
286 See In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litigation—MDL No. 2165, 704 F.3d 962 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(denying motion by hunting group to intervene in litigation); see, also, In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 
Deadline Litigation, Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement, 2011 WL 2695639 (D.D.C. July 12, 2011).  
287 See 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1), (b)(1). 
288 See id. §1533(b)(2). 
289 See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl (Strix Occidentalis Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482-83 (W.D. Wash. 
1988) (requiring agency to consider all expert opinion on population viability).  
290 See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1024-29 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
FWS failed to consider all relevant evidence and articulate rational connection between scientific evidence and 
conclusion reached in delisting grizzly bear). 
291 See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 770 F. Supp.2d 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (reviewing critical habitat 
determinations for Cape Sable seaside sparrow). 
292 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp.2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010) (reviewing Secretary’s 
determination regarding distinct population segments of Rocky Mountain grey wolf).  
293 See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.  
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The most obvious way to inform research agendas might simply be for scientists to analyze 
pending listing and habitat designation petitions, which are a matter of public record.294 One 
potential danger in relying solely on listing petition backlogs, however, is that the citizen listing 
petition process might drive the scientific agenda, rather than vice versa. Although many petitions 
may be legitimate, the process is subject to some potential abuse if project proponents petition the 
agency to list a species that might be affected by that project solely for that purpose. Of course, 
listing may or may not be justified, and petitioners might be sincere in their motives, but those 
motives might not focus on the most important or the most critically threatened or endangered 
species, thus distorting scientific and agency priorities relative to the overall goals of the ESA. 
Moreover, independent scientific research unrelated to pending agency proposals or petitions 
might be the only way some species are identified as threatened or endangered in the first place.295 
If scientists limit their research to pending agency agendas, such discoveries might be missed.  
Given these competing factors, a more considered process of translational ecology could 
be used to optimize the value of independent scientific research in supporting ESA 
implementation. Scientists could meet with agency officials responsible for implementing the ESA 
to review what research would be most useful in assisting with regulatory backlogs, and what 
independent research in particular ecosystems would also be valuable. Environmental groups and 
project developers may also be interested in discussing ways to expedite regulatory decisions, 
because delays ultimately harm all participants in the ESA process. This kind of collaborative 
process would not be binding, of course, leaving scientists free to exercise independent judgment 
in designing and pursuing their research agendas, but those judgments would be better informed 
in ways that might result in more relevant and actionable work.  
2. Recovery plans and monitoring 
Once a species is listed and any critical habitat designated, the agencies are required to 
adopt protective regulations296 and recovery plans297 providing for conservation and survival of 
the species. Recovery plans must include site-specific management actions necessary to protect 
 
294 See supra note 283; 16 U.S.C. §1533(b) (requiring the Secretary to publish public notices of listing findings). 
295 In the most famous example of that phenomenon, the Supreme Court reported in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
that it was the research of a University of Tennessee scientist that identified the peril of the snail darter jeopardized 
by completion of the Tellico Dam. See 437 U.S. at 158-59.  
296 16 U.S.C. §1533(d). 
297 Id. §1533(f).  
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the species and promote its recovery, “objective, measurable criteria” to track progress and 
determine when a species might be delisted, and the estimated time and cost of recovery.298  
Development of recovery plans under the ESA has also proven to be quite challenging, and 
this aspect of the ESA process has also been subject to significant backlogs.299 Agency resource 
limitations may explain part of that slow progress, but a major contributing factor may be scientific 
uncertainty about the causes of species impairment, the actions most likely to contribute to 
recovery, the challenges of monitoring populations (particularly given inevitable population 
volatility), and the appropriate criteria for determining when recovery can be declared. Even when 
plans are adopted and implemented, and populations are monitored effectively, disputes arise 
about whether delisting is appropriate, or whether it might result in a relapse absent continuation 
of protective regulations and affirmative restoration measures.300 Those disputes include both 
value judgments about the degree of conservatism appropriate to use before declaring successful 
recovery, and scientific judgments about factors such as the number of distinct populations that 
should exist to ensure overall species resilience to future risks and genetic variability to prevent 
unhealthy uniformity in the species gene pool—known as “metapopulation” analysis.301  
Congress anticipated the challenges and scientific expertise needs posed by the recovery 
planning, implementation, and monitoring process. It authorized the agencies to “procure the 
services of appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and other qualified persons,” 
and to develop recovery teams exempt from compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act302 to facilitate their operation.303 Thus, despite its scientific complexity and difficulty, in two 
respects it may be easier to pursue translational ecology in the recovery process than in the listing 
and critical habitat phase of ESA implementation. First, the universe of recovery planning targets 
 
298 Id. §1533(f)(1)(B). 
299 See Jacob W. Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Missing, Delayed, and Old: The Status of ESA Recovery Plans, 2018 
CONSERVATION LETTERS e12601, DOI: 10.1111/conl.1260 (finding that nearly one fourth of listed species lack 
recovery plans, half of plans took more than five years to prepare after listing, and half of recovery plans have not 
been updated in 20 years or more). 
300 See, e.g. RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 92, at 120-131 (discussing uncertainties in 
recovery plans and goals for endangered Colorado River fish species). 
301 See Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Populations” Coping with Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR 
CONSERVATION (Michael E. Soulé ed. 1987); Illkka A. Hanski & Daniel Simberloff, The Metapopulation Approach: 
Its History, Conceptual Domain, and Application to Conservation, in METAPOPULATION BIOLOGY, ECOLOGY, 
GENETICS, AND EVOLUTION (Illkka A. Hanski & Michel E. Gilpen, eds. 1997).  
302 Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (Oct. 6, 1972), codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2. See infra Part IV for a discussion of 
the relevance of FACA to translational ecology. 
303 16 U.S.C. §1533(f)(2). 
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for scientific researchers is defined by the species already listed as threatened or endangered, and 
for which the agencies must, or already have, adopted recovery plans. Second, the existing 
statutory authority for collaborative, interdisciplinary recovery teams provides a built-in process 
for the practice of translational ecology. Notably, there is reason to expect that the recovery process 
might be more amenable to multi-stakeholder collaboration than other aspects of ESA 
implementation. Once the agency lists a species as threatened or endangered, all involved 
stakeholders have an incentive to promote effective species recovery. 
3. Interagency consultation  
Another key ESA implementing mechanism is the affirmative requirement imposed in 
section 7 of the ESA for any federal agency, in consultation with the Secretary, to “insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of” designated critical habitat for those species.304 This is among the most far-
reaching of the ESA’s provisions because it applies throughout the federal government.305 As such, 
it is also among the statute’s most controversial provisions, with the potential to stop otherwise 
popular projects or economic activities in their tracks.306  
The fact that Congress imposed this stringent mandate on every federal agency, in 
consultation with the Secretary, dictates that agencies themselves are required to do the work 
necessary to implement this provision. That includes the requirement for agencies to prepare a 
“biological assessment” to determine whether the proposed action might jeopardize any 
threatened or endangered species identified by the Secretary in the project area.307 Based on that 
preliminary assessment and other information, the Secretary is then obligated to prepare a 
“biological opinion” determining the extent to which the proposed action might jeopardize listed 
species or impair their critical habitat, and if such jeopardy or impairment is found, to identify 
“reasonable and prudent alternatives” to the proposed action to avoid those impacts.308 
Although section 7 of the ESA imposes duties directly on federal agencies, Congress was 
again clear that the interagency consultation process must be based on “the best scientific and 
 
304 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2). 
305 This aspect of the ESA is similar to NEPA in that it applies to all federal agencies, not only to specific agencies 
designated to protect and manage environmental resources and values. 
306 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, supra. 
307 16 U.S.C. §1536(c).  
308 Id. §1536(b)(3), (4). 
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commercial information available.”309 This suggests additional opportunities for translational 
ecologists to support the scientific integrity of the consultation process. As was true for the timing 
of the NEPA process,310 however, if scientists only become aware of and involved in research 
relevant to the section 7 consultation process once consultation begins, the time limitations in that 
section311 may prevent new science from influencing the process significantly. The absence of 
meaningful scientific research in advance of interagency consultation, however, might 
compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the analysis. This suggests that translational 
ecologists might increase the relevance of their research agendas by meeting frequently with 
agency officials, project proponents, and other interested stakeholders to develop and pursue 
research that might improve future section 7 consultations.  
IV. Broader Potential Implications of Translational Ecology for Environmental Law 
Part III suggested several key examples of existing federal environmental statutes that 
provide opportunities for scientists to practice the principles of translational ecology usefully and 
effectively. That alone suggests that translational ecology has the potential to improve the 
implementation and effectiveness of those statutory programs. The attributes and aspirations of 
translational ecology identified in Part II, however, as explicated by the examples in Part III, may 
suggest even broader and more systemic implications for our approach to public environmental 
law. Although opinion polls suggest that environmental protection is a widely shared value in the 
United States, 312 environmental law and policy have often been contentious and politicized.313  
It would be naïve to suggest the viability of any “silver bullet” solutions to this trend, but 
several of the attributes of translational ecology suggest ways in which it might shift the focus of 
environmental disputes relatively in the direction of consensus and collaboration that public 
opinion polls suggest should be the norm. The following preliminary analysis suggests two related 
ways in which such a transformation might begin.  
 
309 Id. §1536(a)(2). 
310 See supra Part III.B.1. 
311 See 16 U.S.C. §1526(b) (imposing time limits on consultation process).  
312 The Pew Research Center, for example, reported in 2017 that nearly three quarters of Americans strongly favor 
strong measures to protect the environment, despite deep partisan divides on the issue.  See Monica Anderson, For 
Earth Day, How Americans View Environmental Issues, Apr. 20, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues/. 
313 See Cory Brosnahan, When Did the Environment Become a Partisan Issue?, AMERICAN EXPERIENCE/PBS, Jan. 26, 
2017, https://medium.com/americanexperiencepbs/when-did-the-environment-become-a-partisan-issue-
f914f0ce489e#.vu06dtc6j. 
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A. Collaborative science in public environmental law  
Many legal disputes are characterized by a “battle of experts.” Litigation results may turn 
on judicial or jury decisions about the correctness of competing sets of scientific experts in cases 
ranging from garden variety traffic accidents314 to complex medical malpractice cases315 to private 
environmental disputes in the realm of toxic torts.316 In an adversarial legal system, it makes sense 
that private parties will retain competing experts to debate competing scientific theories about the 
cause and effects of injuries and other matters involved in those private disputes. Although the 
accuracy of the result is important to the individual litigants, society’s interest in the matter is in 
ensuring that the decision process is fair and that the system as a whole is likely to reach the 
“correct” result more often than not. 
 Public environmental disputes317 are also characterized frequently by battles of experts, 
whether between agency scientists and experts retained by industry, environmental groups, or both. 
Such disputes may involve the scientific support for an agency regulation,318 the degree to which 
pollution from one or more sources has caused harm,319 or the viability and justification of 
proposed methods to restore an ecosystem or compensate for past harm.320 In such cases, the nature 
of the scientific disputes themselves may be similar to those in purely private environmental 
matters. Which side has collected the best and most reliable data? Whose scientific theory or 
analysis of the data is more likely to be correct?  
 The public’s stake in this kind of dispute, however, includes but also transcends the legal 
goal of ensuring due process and system designed to “get it right” more often than not. Because 
the resolution of public environmental disputes or regulatory decisions affects public health and 
welfare, as well as the protection, use, and management of public natural resources, the public also 
 
314 See, e.g., Dufrene v. Willingham, 721 So.2d 1026, (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998) (evaluating qualifications of accident 
reconstruction experts). 
315 See, e.g., Seastrunk v. United States, 25 F. Supp.3d 812 (D. So.Car. 2014) (discussing essential requirement of 
expert evidence in proving medical malpractice claim). 
316 See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986) (evaluating disputes over causation 
and resulting injury due to groundwater contamination). 
317 Even though some individuals, businesses, or other groups may be affected by the result of an environmental 
regulatory dispute more than others, I consider a public environmental dispute to be one in which more parties than 
the immediate litigants have a significant stake in the result, up to and including the public at large. 
318 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (evaluating scientific 
justification for workplace exposure standard for benzene). 
319 See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (evaluating 
agency evidence of health effects from lead exposure). 
320 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623 F. Supp.2d 1015 (D. Ariz. 2009) (adjudicating 
adequacy of government efforts to restore Colorado River ecosystem downstream of Glen Canyon Dam). 
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has a compelling interest in the substance of the dispute. In a private dispute, absent a mutually 
beneficial settlement or mediated resolution, one party or the other will always lose, even if the 
result turns out to be incorrect. In a public environmental dispute, an incorrect scientific conclusion 
could result in harm to large members of the public,321 including irreversible human or 
environmental harm or lost or depleted resources that cannot be recovered.322 
 The judicial approach to this issue is to err on the side of agency scientists and other public 
officials to whom Congress (or a state legislature) delegates responsibility to protect and promote 
the public welfare. Thus, scientific disputes involving regulatory decisions typically are subject to 
an “arbitrary and capricious”323 or “substantial evidence” standard of review,324 although that is 
not true for all disputes between public entities and private parties in environmental disputes 
involving competing experts.325 Agency scientists have no personal stake in the outcome, and 
unlike experts retained by private parties are not hired for the purpose of proving a particular 
scientific proposition beneficial to that side. Deferring to agency experts, therefore, presumably 
does not impair our quest to base environmental policy decisions on science that is more likely 
than not to be correct. It does not, however, eliminate the adversarial approach to environmental 
science that has characterized, if not dominated, public discourse about environmental issues in 
and out of the courts. The raging debate about the validity of climate science326 is perhaps the most 
vivid and divisive example of that tendency.  
 It is entirely appropriate for competing resource users and other members of the public to 
debate policy issues relevant to environmental protection and natural resource management. 
Indeed, given the range of legitimate views about competing resource uses and values, that is 
healthy in a pluralistic society. Decisions that properly consider and balance those competing 
 
321 See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (deciding whether 
analysis of safety of Three Mile Island nuclear power plant must consider psychological harm to large numbers of 
community members). 
322 See, e.g., In re: the Exxon Valdez, 27 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing propriety of punitive and other damages 
in light of irreversible damage to natural resources). 
323 See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) 
(explaining arbitrary and capricious standard of review). 
324 See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148 (2019) (discussing substantial evidence standard of 
review). 
325 A civil enforcement action brought by an agency for violation of an environmental standard typically is subject to 
the same “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable to civil disputes between private parties. A criminal 
enforcement action is necessarily subject to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard needed to satisfy criminal due 
process standards. 
326 See KARI MARIE NORGAARD, LIVING IN DENIAL: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMOTIONS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2011). 
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views should turn on a combination of legal, social, and economic factors, as proponents of 
translational ecology acknowledge.  
Those decisions should also be informed adequately, however, by sound science. Stated 
simply, if we cannot reach reasonable consensus on the state of the relevant science—even if that 
consensus identifies and quantifies uncertainties and remaining unknowns—we will not be able to 
reach consensus on the surrounding policy issues. Granted, the scientific process does not generate 
a singular “truth” about any given issue but rather seeks continued improvement in scientific 
knowledge and understanding. Moreover, science often generates legitimate competing theories 
and explanations. Nevertheless, the idea that advocates for particular policy positions should 
generate their own version of sound science to serve their intended policy goals, rather than as a 
means of seeking truth through legitimate competing theories, is equally inconsistent with the 
scientific method. It is also not compatible with society’s goal to reach well-informed decisions 
about important matters of public environmental policy. The persistence of climate science denial 
is the clearest and most dangerous current example of that phenomenon.327 
  The concept of translational ecology may suggest a process to transcend these persistent 
debates fueled by the inherently adversarial nature of our litigation and administrative law 
processes. Collaborative efforts could identify scientific research agendas most useful in 
deciding and acting on the most important environmental protection and natural resource 
management issues. Those collaborations could involve interdisciplinary groups of scientists, 
agency officials responsible for the relevant decisions, and other stakeholders such as affected 
residents, resource users (industry, agriculture, etc.), and environmental groups. Academic and 
other independent scientists, in addition to any government scientists working on the issue, could 
pursue that research and convene periodically to share results and determine what degree of 
consensus is possible on the relevant issues. To the extent possible, decisions could proceed on 
the basis of that shared consensus. Ideally, the process would generate increasing trust over time 
if the resulting scientific research and analysis is perceived as objective rather than beholden to 
particular interest groups. 
 
327 See, generally, NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS  
OBSUCRED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (chronicling industry efforts to 
generate doubt about important public health and environmental risks). 
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It would be naïve to believe that this kind of process will eliminate all disputes about the 
environmental science relevant to important policy decisions. No private or government process 
can force individuals or organizations to accept or believe any scientific theory, evidence, or 
explanation against their will, or contrary to their interests. Indeed, there is some risk that some 
participants might “game” such a system by participating when convenient but disclaiming the 
results or failing to reach consensus when it does not further their interests to do so. The same is 
true for regulatory negotiations,328 however, or any other dispute resolution process that relies on 
the integrity of the process and good will of the participants. 
 No additional legal authority or process is essential to facilitate the use of translational 
ecology in this way to improve the shared knowledge base on which environmental decisions are 
made through existing statutory and regulatory mechanisms. Translational ecology collaborations 
can be convened with varying degrees of formality, by scientists themselves, agencies, groups of 
stakeholders, and any combination thereof. They can stand alone or be used in conjunction with 
any of the examples discussed in Part III, or other appropriate environmental law programs or 
decisions. Once sufficient experience with the process has been gained, however, particularly if 
initial experiments succeed, additional statutory authority might be useful to further legitimize and 
facilitate the process. Congress might, for example, create additional exceptions to the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as it has done in the ESA.329 It might amend NEPA or other 
statutory processes to provide specifically for translational ecology processes, and potentially 
provide funding to encourage and support them.330 Whatever degree of formal process is used, 
however, translational ecology has potential to improve the manner in which we use science to 
inform public environmental decisions. 
B. Translational ecology and the administrative process  
The concept of translational ecology also raises questions about the role and status of 
academic and other independent scientists as public intellectuals providing assistance to a public 
process. Presumably, to the extent that independent scientists provide input into a public process, 
 
328 See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the 
Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351 (1997) (critiquing the promise of regulatory negotiation).  
329 See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.  
330 It is not unreasonable to predict that, in many cases, the total cost of achieving consensus on scientific issues 
collaboratively is likely to be considerably less than the cost of generating competing scientific research, and then 
litigating which is more “correct” as between the competing theories or evidence. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3451593 
 55 
such as informal notice and comment rulemaking,331 independent scientists are subject to the same 
legal privileges and constraints as other individuals or entities regarding access to agency officials 
and the agency process. Privileges include the right to comment on proposed agency rules or other 
actions subject to public notice and comment,332 and constraints include those imposed by 
FACA333 and other limits designed to ensure that some individuals and interest groups do not enjoy 
superior access to government decisions and decision makers than others. 
Of course, there are a number of ways in which academic and other scientists might 
legitimately be provided special opportunities to inform agency decisions and processes. They 
might receive federal grant funding specifically to engage in scientific research relevant to agency 
programs. They might serve as consultants or contractors working on specific research or advisory 
tasks for an agency. They might be appointed to serve on advisory boards or committees created 
by Congress pursuant to statute, such as EPA’s Science Advisory Board,334 or by an agency 
pursuant to FACA.  
Short of that kind of special status, however, independent scientists have the same 
relationship to agency officials as other citizens, even though they do not ordinarily act on behalf 
of particular interest groups.335 They might present research and other information, including 
opinions about matters that might bear on public environmental policy, in neutral forums such as 
academic or professional conferences or meetings; and obviously agency officials have access to 
the results of their published research. That is different, however, than engaging in a collaborative 
process of translational ecology in which scientists meet with agency officials to help develop 
research agendas more likely to be useful to agency decisions and other actions, and then to 
communicate their research results to the agency in an ongoing and iterative process. That might 
well be perceived as a violation of FACA336 or other rules limiting access by outside individuals 
to agency decisions and process. 
 
331 See 5 U.S.C. §553. 
332 See id. §553(c). 
333 5 U.S.C. App.2. 
334 See 42 U.S.C. §4365. 
335 Individual scientists, of course, may well hold particular personal beliefs about issues of environmental policy, and 
may be members of professional organizations or advocacy groups that might take positions on particular issues. 
336 An “advisory committee” subject to the limitations of FACA includes any committee “established or utilized by 
one or more agencies.” FACA §3(2)(C). See Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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One key exception to FACA is for advisory committees established by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) or the National Academy of Public Administration.337 Thus, NAS 
might play a role in facilitating translational ecology by creating committees of environmental 
scientists to work with agencies and other end users of environmental science to help scientists 
increase the utility of their research to agency officials. NAS committees, however, typically are 
formed to address specific—if often important and broadly focused—issues in which science plays 
a key role in informing public policy. Moreover, FACA includes restrictions designed to ensure 
that agencies to not rely on the NAS exception to circumvent FACA’s purposes.338  
Alternatively, of course, agencies could simply comply with the requirements of FACA in 
establishing translational ecology collaborations. That requires steps such as public notice, open 
public meetings, opportunities for public comment, recordkeeping and availability of public 
records, etc.339 Such requirements are entirely sensible for advisory committees comprised of 
interest group representatives that otherwise might have inappropriate, disproportionate, and 
undisclosed access to agency officials.340 They may be perceived as unduly burdensome for 
purposes of consultations about the research of outside scientists. Moreover, one purpose of FACA 
was to prevent the proliferation of federal advisory committees and their sunset once no longer 
useful,341 and each FACA committee must be formally approved by the President or a federal 
agency head.342 Thus, the FACA process may be too burdensome to facilitate translational ecology 
consultations, especially at local or regional levels.  
In light of these considerations, it seems legitimate to ask whether steps should be taken to 
modify the ways in which independent scientists can interact with administrative agency officials 
to facilitate the work of translational ecology, through specific statutory authority, additional but 
conditioned exemptions to FACA, or otherwise. Unconstrained exemptions could be problematic 
 
337 FACA §3(2). FACA also exempts advisory committees created by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal 
Reserve System, or the Director of National Intelligence for reasons of national security. Id. §4(b). 
338 The statute prohibits agencies from relying on the advice of NAS committees if they exercise management control 
over such committees, unless they comply with requirements equivalent to those that apply to FACA committees to 
ensure public notice and a balance of representation on the committee. FACA §15. See Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (case involving allegation of FACA violations by Department of 
Energy in connection with NAS Committee). 
339 FACA §§ 9-12.  
340 See Huron Envtl. Activist League v. U.S. EPA, 917 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1996). 
341 FACA has the dual purposes of preventing creation of and ensuring the sunset of unnecessary advisory committees, 
and of ensuring public accountability for committees that are formed. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 
104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc denied, 114 F.3d 1209, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 949. 
342 FACA §9(a). 
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if they allow an unintended “back door” for interest groups to influence agency officials and 
decisions in ways the APA and FACA are designed to prevent. The goals of translational ecology 
are sufficiently laudable, however, that it would be unfortunate if they cannot be achieved due to 
restrictions on agency access designed to prevent problems that are not relevant or significant in 
this context. 
V. Conclusion  
Translational ecology shares some elements with predecessor methods or theories of 
applied environmental science, such as conservation biology, adaptive management, resilience 
theory, and ecosystem and watershed management. All of those ideas have had significant and 
largely positive impacts on environmental and natural resource law, and those impacts are likely 
to continue. At least in its formative stages, however, translational ecology appears to be more 
broadly conceptualized than some of those earlier methods, and more procedurally focused than 
others. These attributes suggest that it may have broader applicability to environmental law than 
any of the predecessor ideas.  
Viewed in the most optimistic light, translational ecology’s collaborative and trust-building 
approach to generating “actionable” environmental science has the potential to improve the 
implementation of various environmental statutes and programs. Providing better, more targeted 
scientific analysis in ways that are trusted by a wider range of stakeholders could help to achieve 
a greater degree of consensus about the core scientific information needed to make sound 
environmental policy decisions, rather than continuing to engage in endless “battles of experts” 
over every relevant set of scientific issues.343 That could focus environmental decisionmakers and 
stakeholders on the key legal, social, economic, and other trans-scientific factors needed to reach 
decisions in light of the underlying science.  
It would be a mistake, however, to anticipate that translational ecology alone will result in 
easy consensus on all disputed environmental issues—particularly those for which stakeholders 
have deeply entrenched positions. First, if powerful interest groups continue to benefit from 
contesting the relevant science, even in areas such as climate science where the scientific 
consensus is so robust, they are likely to continue that denialism. Second, the social, political, and 
economic factors that underlie some of our most longstanding and deeply fought environmental 
 
343 It would be highly unrealistic, of course, to expect that scientific disputes in environmental law will end, particularly 
in litigation contexts. 
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battles may continue to dominate the debates in those areas. Viewed in the most cynical light, 
recent events demonstrate how readily politics can undermine science.344  
Those limitations, however, should not deter ecologists and other environmental scientists 
from using translational ecology to improve the scientific basis for environmental decisions and 
programs. Better and more relevant information will always move us in the direction of better 
environmental outcomes. 
 
344 See, e.g., Associated Press, Trump Administration Moves to Weaken Endangered Species Act, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2019, available at https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-08-12/trump-endangered-species-act; Pt. II.A.1.b, 
supra (discussing Trump Administration withdrawal of CWA rule supported by extensive scientific synthesis).  
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